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GLOBALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
Bui Ngoc Son

 
Abstract:  This Article extends Gary J. Jacobsohn’s theory of 
constitutional identity to better understand the dynamics of constitutional identity in 
the era of globalization.  The extended theoretical framework features the relation of 
constitutional globalization to the change of national constitutional identity.  Within 
that framework, this Article offers an original, empirical examination of the case of 
Vietnam and compares it with other socialist regimes (China, Laos, North Korea, and 
Cuba).  It argues that globalization induces adaption to the socialist constitutional 
identity.  The socialist constitutional identity is adapted by the pragmatic 
incorporation of fundamental ideas and principles of global constitutionalism.  
Consequently, the essence of the socialist constitutional identity remains but is 
modified and extended in the globalizing context.  Although there is convergence in 
the adaption to socialist constitutional identity among the five socialist countries due 
to the impact of constitutional globalization, there are four divergent models which 
these countries adopt to react to the global impact on their constitutional identity, 
namely constitutional globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism 
(China); constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional reservationism 
(Cuba).  This Article contributes to the scholarship on constitutional globalization, 
comparative theory on constitutional identity, and empirical knowledge on 
constitutional dynamics in the contemporary socialist world.    
INTRODUCTION 
The world is globalizing constitutionally.  Professor Sarah H. 
Cleveland describes the U.S. Constitution as an “international 
constitution” in the sense that the U.S. Supreme Court cites international 
sources in its constitutional interpretation.
1
  In a recent case, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, Justice Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court cited 
Confucius in his majority decision, interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment to uphold same sex marriage: “The centrality of marriage to 
the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed 
for millennia and across civilizations. . . . Confucius taught that marriage 
lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. 
Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967).”2  Conversely, ideas of 
American constitutionalism have been diffused into China.  In a national 
                                                             

  Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore 
Faculty of Law; PhD, University of Hong Kong; Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School (2012).  I 
am deeply grateful to Gary J. Jacobsohn for his constructive comments and suggestions.  I greatly 
appreciate Kevin Tan for his suggestions and inspiring conversations.  For useful comments on early 
drafts of this Article, I thank Henning Glaser, John Gillespie, Tom Ginsburg, Pip Nicholson, and 
participants in the workshops What is Socialist About Socialist Law, and Identity and Change – The 
Basic Structure in Asian Constitutional Orders.  This Article also benefits from discussions with 
Albert Chen, Weitseng Chen, Fu Hualing, Andrew Harding, Jaclyn Neo, Dan W. Puchniak, Cheryl 
Saunders, Adrienne Stone, Arun Thiruvengadam, and Wang Jiangyu.   
1
  See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 
(2006). 
2
  Obergefell v.  Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 3, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
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constitutional debate in 2013, Chinese pro-constitutionalists advocated 
for the practice of American-style constitutionalism in China.
3
  Professor 
Mark Tushnet argues that globalization of constitutional law is now 
inevitable.
4
  Constitutional globalization affects not only the design of 
constitutional rules and institutions.  More fundamentally, it induces the 
changes to constitutional identity.  I call this phenomenon “globalization 
of constitutional identity.” 5 
Constitutional identity refers to constitutional ideas and principles 
fundamental to a polity.  It is a part of what Francis Fukuyama calls the 
“shared mental models,” which he conceives as “critical in facilitating 
large-scale collective action.”6  Nobel laureate Douglas North also states 
that: “Ideas and ideologies matter, and institutions play a major role in 
determining just how much they matter.  Ideas and ideologies shape the 
subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world 
around them and make choices.”7  Constitutional identity shapes the 
formulation of constitutional institutions and their practices.  Therefore, a 
study on constitutional identity change is crucial to understand the 
possibilities and constraints of constitutional institutions and functional 
changes to those institutions.   
This study is connected to the growing scholarship on global 
constitutional law and comparative constitutional theory.
8
  Several global 
                                                             
3
  See Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate 
and the "Urgency" of Political Reform, 11 U. Pa. ASIA L. REV. 337 (2016); Rogier Creemers, China's 
Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications, 74 CHINA J. 91 (2015). 
4
  See generally Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 985 (2009).  
5
  Several related terms should be defined.  In this study, the term “constitutional globalization” 
is used to refer to the global expansion or diffusion of global constitutional ideas, norms, and 
institutions.  The term “global constitutionalism” is used interchangeably with the term “generic 
constitutionalism” to refer to normative constitutional ideals associated with limited government which 
have informed constitutional design and practice around the world. 
6
  FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 442 (2011). 
7
  DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
111 (1990). 
8
  See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
(2010); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV.  
1277 (2008); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 64 (2013); David S. 
Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.  
762 (2012); Rosalind Dixon & Eric A Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHINA J.  
INT'L L. 399 (2011).   
For purposes of this Article, I focus on the globalization of domestic constitutional law and put 
aside the related issue of constitutionalization of the global order.  For the latter, see AOIFE 
O'DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISATION (2014); RULING THE WORLD: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.  
Trachtman eds., 2009); TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
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constitutional studies have been conducted by collecting quantitative data 
for all available national constitutions during the last six decades and 
employing methods of econometrics to test the predictions of global 
constitutional diffusion.  This is a significant contribution, given the 
dearth of empirical and quantitative studies in constitutional scholarship.
9
  
However, quantitative studies of global constitutional law must be 
qualified.  Case-studies are necessary to qualitatively understand the 
causal effect of global constitutional diffusion.  In addition, studies on 
constitutional globalization focus mainly on the global spread of 
constitutional rules and institutions.  More fundamental is the global 
spread of general ideas and principles of constitutionalism.   
Five communist countries survived the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 
namely China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.  Identifying 
themselves as socialist countries, they have maintained distinctive 
constitutional systems defined by fundamental constitutional principles 
rooted in Marxist-Leninism and Soviet constitutional tradition.  However, 
during the post-Soviet era, the force of constitutional globalization has 
compelled the socialist regimes to adapt their constitutional core.  Even 
the communist state which attempts to be a global constitutional outlier 
by developing constitutional “characteristics”10 is not immune to the 
impact of constitutional globalization.
11
  
These socialist regimes have been largely ignored in comparative 
constitutional inquiry, leading constitutional comparativists to lament that 
comparative constitutional law focuses mainly on a limited set of 
established liberal constitutional systems in North America and Europe, 
as well as a few other states with similar institutional settings.
12
  In 
addition to linguistic and cultural considerations,
13
 the marginalization of 
socialist constitutional experiences stems from the epistemic assumption 
                                                                                                                                                                              
MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007); Symposium, Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385 (2009). 
9
  Sujit Choudhry, Method in Comparative Constitutional Law: A Comment on Law and 
Versteeg, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2078, 2087 (2012). 
10
   See generally Larry Catá Backer & Keren Wang, The Emerging Structures of Socialist 
Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra Judicial Detention and the Chinese 
Constitutional Order, 23 PAC.  RIM LAW & POL'Y J. 251 (2014). 
11
 Haig Patapan, Towards a Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism: On Universalism and 
Particularism in Chinese Constitutionalism, 3 CHINESE J.  COMP.  L.  78 (2015). 
12
 RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 212 (2014); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative 
Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 8 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Cheryl 
Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool, 4 NAT’L TAIWAIN U. L. REV. 3 (2009). 
13
  See Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 323 (2010). 
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that the socialist countries have strictly adhered to socialist ideology 
which restricts constitutional dynamics.  This may not enrich 
comparative constitutional inquiry.  As this study will illustrate, this 
assumption is flawed.  Constitutional dynamics in the contemporary 
socialist world illustrate new aspects of constitutional law, especially the 
globalization of constitutional law, which can enrich global constitutional 
studies.  For example, socialist experiences suggest that formal 
constitutional change processes operate as the platform for global/local 
constitutional dialogue.   
This study is built upon scholarship on constitutional identity.
14
  
“‘Constitutional identity’ is an essentially contested concept as there is no 
agreement over what it means or refers to.”15  Two different versions of 
constitutional identity theory are developed by Gary J. Jacobsohn and 
Michel Rosenfeld.  While Jacobsohn—in his book Constitutional 
Identity—is more concerned with the identity of the constitution, 
Rosenfeld—in his book The Identity of Constitutional Subject—focuses 
more on the identity of the people as the constitutional subject.  This 
Article focuses on the identity of the constitution, and therefore 
Jacobsohn’s theory is more relevant.  Jacobsohn explains constitutional 
identity change as a dialogical process animated by the element of 
disharmony.  Although this theory provides useful tools to conceptualize 
constitutional identity change, it is informed by liberal constitutional 
experiences and must be extended to better understand the experience of 
different constitutional settings.   
The purposes of this article are therefore twofold: (1) to extend 
Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional identity; and (2) to apply the 
extended theoretical framework to examine the causal effect of 
constitutional globalization on the change of domestic constitutional 
identity with specific reference to the cases of the contemporary 
socialist/communist regimes.   
Part I establishes the extended theoretical framework featuring the 
relation of constitutional globalization to the change of national 
constitutional identity.  It defines constitutional identity as constitutional 
                                                             
14
  See generally GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010); MICHEL ROSENFELD, 
THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND 
COMMUNITY (2010); Michel Troper, Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity 
in France, in CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY: VALUES AND CONSTITUTIONS 187 (András Sajó & 
Renata Uitz eds., 2010). 
15
  Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 756, 756 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
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ideas and principles fundamental to a polity and explains that the change 
to constitutional identity is the consequence of the dialogical interaction 
between global and local constitutional identities.   
After a brief introduction of the features of socialist constitutional 
identity in Part II, Parts III and IV apply the above framework to the 
cases of the five socialist regimes.  Globalization induces adaption to the 
socialist constitutional identity.  The socialist constitutional identity is 
adapted by the pragmatic incorporation of fundamental ideas and 
principles of global constitutionalism.  Consequently, the essence of the 
socialist constitutional identity remains, but is modified and extended in 
the globalizing context. 
 Part III illustrates this argument using the case of Vietnam.  This 
case-study is based on original, empirical work: my interviews with 
constitutional scholars, constitution-makers, members of the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee, constitutional advisors for top 
political leaders, Assembly deputies, and National Assembly officers.
16
 
This primary work is combined with analysis of Vietnamese materials: 
documents and statements of constitution-makers and political leaders, 
and scholarly writings on Vietnamese constitutional issues.   
Part IV turns to a comparative context.  Although there is 
convergence in the adaption of socialist constitutional identity among the 
five socialist countries due to the impact of constitutional globalization, 
there are four divergent models which these countries adopt to react to 
the global impact on their constitutional identity, namely constitutional 
globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism (China); 
constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional 
reservationism (Cuba).   
This Article makes three major contributions.  First, for 
scholarship on constitutional globalization, it suggests that not only rules 
and institutions, but constitutional identity is also globalized.  Second, 
this Article refines and extends the comparative theory of constitutional 
identity by considering the dynamics of constitutional identity in non-
constitutionalist polities influenced by globalization, the disharmony 
between national and global constitutionalism, and the non-judicial 
mechanism of local and global constitutional dialogue which animates 
                                                             
16
  Due to sensitive nature of the issue, most interviewees remained anonymous, but other details 
are specified.  When the footnotes are addressed as “Interviews” this indicates that the statements or 
evidence were drawn over several interviews, which will not be specified. 
468 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.   26 NO.   3 
 
constitutional identity change.  Third, it enriches general knowledge of 
comparative constitutional law by examining socialist experiences.   
I. GLOBALIZATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE 
A. Constitutional Identity 
A commentator distinguishes two ideas of constitutional identity: 
1) identity of the constitution, and 2) identity of the people as the 
constitutional subjects.
17
  I will characterize the former as the thin 
approach and the latter as the thick approach.  In the American debate, 
Rosenfeld represents the latter, while Jacobsohn represents the former.  
Rosenfeld conceptualizes constitutional identity as identity of the 
constitutional subject of the people, which is “immersed in complex and 
ambiguous relations with other relevant identities; such as, national, 
ethnic, religious, or cultural identity.”18  Rosenfeld offers a 
philosophically sophisticated theory of constitutional subjects.  However, 
his theory has to grapple with a number of questions: Who constitutes the 
people? Are the people really the constitutional subject? Who, in 
particular, are the authors of authoritarian constitutions that are not 
ordained by “we the people”? How does one distinguish the 
constitutional identity of the people from their national, cultural, 
religious, and moral identities? If constitutional identity collapses into 
one or more of these identities, is it still a distinctive subject for 
constitutional inquiry?  For these confusing questions, this study does not 
attempt to pursue the identity of the people as the constitutional subject.   
Instead, my study adopts a thin approach, which focuses on 
constitutional identity as presented in Jacobsohn’s work.  This approach 
avoids the confusing conceptual questions, and is useful for empirical 
analysis.  For Jacobsohn, constitutional identity refers to constitutional 
goals, aspirations, and commitments that a political community pursues 
which are normally codified in a national constitutional text.
19
  Therefore, 
“[t]o establish the identity of a constitution, it obviously makes sense to 
scrutinize carefully the text itself.  This provides us with a documentary 
transcript of how a particular group of framers provided for the 
governance of their polity, and it often includes their aspirations for its 
subsequent development.”20  Jacobsohn distinguishes generic and 
                                                             
17
  José Luis Martí, Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v.  
Identity of the People, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 17 
(Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).   
18
  Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 
1049 (1995). 
19
  See generally JACOBSOHN, supra note 14. 
20
  Id. at 348. 
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specific constitutional identity: “All constitutional polities represent a 
blend of characteristics revealing what is particular to the constitutional 
culture as well as what are widely viewed as common attributes of a 
universal culture of constitutionalism.”21  Jacobsohn, however, focuses 
more on specific constitutional identity.
22
  
Jacobsohn argues that “the concept of constitutional identity 
should be at the center of constitutional theory.”23  If so, constitutional 
identity must be a distinctive concept.  For this purpose, I submit that the 
concept of constitutional identity must be distinctively constitutional so 
that it can be distinguished from the concepts of national or cultural 
identity.  Moreover, the concept of constitutional identity must be 
distinctively identitarian so that it can be distinguished from other 
constitutional concepts like “unwritten constitution” or “living 
originalism” which also concern deep constitutional principles.24 
With that in mind, I define constitutional identity as constitutional 
ideas and principles fundamental to a constitutional system.  It is 
characterized by the following features.  First, constitutional identity is 
about constitutional ideas and principles existing at the fundamental 
level, resonating with what political scientists variably call “the ‘public 
philosophies’, ‘public sentiments’, ‘deep core’- worldviews or 
Weltanschauung that undergird the policies and programs with 
organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society.”25  
Second, constitutional identity is constitutional in the sense that it refers 
to deep ideas pertaining to the nature of constitution, constitutional 
structure, constitutional rights, and socio-economic constitutional 
principles that underpin quotidian constitutional practices, which are 
normally codified in a nation’s constitutional text.  Third, constitutional 
identity is identitarian in the sense that the constitutional ideas and 
principles present beliefs on long-term goals, aspirations, and 
commitments constituting the essence of a constitutional polity.
26
  
                                                             
21
  Id. at 22. 
22
  Id. at 18. 
23
  Id. at 3. 
24
 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2011).   For review of this book and the author’s response, see David A.  
Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (2013); Akhil Reed Amar, American 
Constitutionalism — Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 195 (2013); JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
25
 Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse, 11 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 303, 306 (2008) (citations omitted).   
26
 Jacobsohn particularly underlines the aspirational aspect of constitutional identity.  For his 
extensive treatment on this, see GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986).  For other discussions on constitutional aspiration, see 
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So understood, constitutional identity is a distinctive concept and a 
distinctive object for comparative constitutional inquiry.  The prevailing 
trend in comparative constitutional studies is the focus on rules and 
institutions.  However, underlying these rules and institutions are deep 
constitutional ideas.  Not only does a constitution provide concrete 
guidance for political conduct of constitutional actors, but it also 
implicitly or explicitly includes fundamental ideas which provide a 
general directive of beliefs, aspirations, and commitments that propel the 
function of the whole constitutional system.  So, a study about 
constitutional identity is distinctive in that it focuses not on rules and 
institutions but on essential constitutional ideas and principles.  It may 
refer to rules and institutions as the embodiment of constitutional ideas 
and principles.  Constitutional identity inquiries are also different from 
studies on unwritten or living constitutionalism in that they take written 
constitutions seriously as the textual embodiments of constitutional 
identity.   
B. Constitutional Disharmony 
Constitutional identity is not fixed, but changeable.  Jacobsohn 
draws on Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of tradition to develop a theory on 
the nature and dynamic of constitutional identity.  For MacIntyre, “a 
living tradition is . . . a historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.”27  He considers tradition as the embodiment of 
“continuities of conflicts.”28  In his understanding, “a tradition becomes 
mature just insofar as its adherents confront and find a national way 
through or around these encounters with radical different and 
incompatible positions.”29  Jacobsohn draws on MacIntyre's theory of 
tradition as a living thing presenting “continuities and conflicts” to 
support his theory regarding the nature and dynamic of constitutional 
identity.  He argues that constitutional identity “emerges dialogically and 
represents a mix of political aspirations and commitments that are 
expressive of a nation’s past, as well as the determination of those within 
the society who seek in some ways to transcend the past.”30  
To Jacobsohn, the dynamics of constitutional identity are animated 
by “the universal constitutional condition, which is that in one way or 
another all constitutions confront or embody the problem of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Symposium, Constitutional Interpretation and Aspirations to a Good Society: The Natural Rights-
Based Justification for Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119 (2001). 
27
  ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 207 (1981). 
28
  Id. at 206. 
29
  ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 327 (1988).    
30
  JACOBSOHN, supra note 14, at 7.   
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disharmony.”31  He states that “the ‘disharmonic constitution’ does not 
refer to the incoherence of constitutions- though that may indeed be the 
condition of some- but to the dissonance within and around the 
constitution that is key to understand its identity.”32  There are two 
aspects of the disharmonic constitution: internal and external.  The text of 
national constitution is itself disharmonic in the sense that it encompasses 
competing commitments or “contradiction and imbalances.”33  So, the 
exploration of constitutional identity requires the understanding of 
alternative visions and aspirations internal to the constitutional text.  The 
external aspect refers to the gap between the aspirational constitutional 
commitments or ideals and the reality, or in Jacobsohn’s parlance, “the 
lack of agreement evident in the sharp discontinuities that frame the 
constitution’s relationship to the surrounding society.”34  Constitutional 
disharmony provokes change in constitutional identity.  Jacobsohn states 
that “to apprehend constitutional identity is to see its dynamic quality, 
which results from the interplay of forces seeking either to introduce 
greater harmony into the constitutional equation or, contrariwise, to 
create further disharmony.”35  
Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional disharmony is heuristic to 
explore constitutional identity change.  Other scholars share a common 
view, although they may use different terms.  Hanna Pitkin, for example, 
contends that: “To understand what a constitution is, one must look not to 
some crystalline core or essence of unambiguous meaning but precisely 
at the ambiguities, the specific oppositions that this specific concept 
helps us to hold in tension.”36  Ideology theory in legal sociology also 
makes similar claims.
37
  Alan Hunt
 
 argues that: “An ideology is not a 
unitary entity.  It draws its power from its ability to connect and combine 
diverse mental elements (concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that 
influence and structure the perception and cognition of social agents.”38  
The idea of disharmony also resonated with the Marxist dialectic’s thesis 
                                                             
31
  Id. at 86–87. 
32
  Id. at 15.   
33
  Id. at 87.  For example, the commitments to both positive and negative rights.  Id. at 149. 
34
  Id. at 87.  This is due to the fact that the constitutions are committed to “the achievement of 
things seemingly beyond its immediate reach.” Id. at 145.  Jacobsohn gives example of Directive 
Principles of State Policy in India Constitution, which are nonjusticiable.  Id. at 146.  As we will see in 
the case-studies below, the socialist constitutions also include many aspirations that are disharmonic to 
the social reality. 
35
  Id. at 88.   
36
  Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37  J. LEG. EDU. 167, 167 (1987).   
37
  NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES (T. O’Hagan trans., 1973); Alan 
Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of Ideology to the Analysis 
of Law, 19 L. SOC. REV. 11 (1985); Maureen Cain, Gramsci, The State and the Place of Law, in 
LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE (David Sugerman ed., 1983).  I thank John Gillespie for drawing 
my attention to this literature.   
38
  Hunt, supra note 37, at 16. 
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on conflicts as the source of change, which has influenced the political 
ideology in socialist regimes.   
The theory of constitutional disharmony seemingly contradicts the 
Confucian philosophy of social harmony, which has informed political 
culture in such countries like China and Vietnam.  In fact, Confucianism 
promotes the idea of “harmony but not sameness” (Analects, 13:23).  
Chenyang Li’s recent comprehensive treatment of the theme suggests 
that, in Confucian philosophy, harmony exists with creative tension and 
does not exclude conflicts and differences.
39
  Particularly, according to 
the Book of Change or I Ching, one of the Confucian Five Classics,
40
 the 
logics of change essentially lie on the interaction of the two conflicting 
forces called Yin and Yang. 
However, several points in Jacobsohn’s theory must be qualified 
and refined.  To begin with, constitutional identity dynamics are defined 
by the dialogical interactions between local (specific) and global 
(generic) constitutional identity.  The universal constitutional condition 
of disharmony, in one way or another, manifests in all constitutions, not 
necessarily liberal constitutions.  This is evident if we consider the 
generic and specific contents of constitutional identity.  The legal 
codification of both generic and specific values and principles in a single 
charter constitutes conflicting aspirations and commitments.  
Constitutional identity emerges as the consequence of the dialogical 
interactions between generic and specific aspirations and commitments.  
Moreover, within a particular constitutional polity, there are pluralized, 
particularistic values and principles that govern the polity whose 
dialogical interactions create the dynamics of constitutional identity.   
However, although Jacobsohn recognizes that the disharmony 
between generic and specific aspiration is the condition of change in 
constitutional identity, he directs most of his attention to disharmony of 
specific constitutional identity.  The explanation for this is that his theory 
is developed on the experience of constitutionalist states (the United 
States, India, Israel, and Ireland) whose constitutions already incorporate 
the generic requirements of constitutionalism.  If constitutional identity is 
understood as the identity of the constitution, not the identity of the 
people as constitutional authors, even non-constitutionalist polities can 
also acquire constitutional identity.  Authoritarian polities are also 
committed to fundamental aspirations codified in their constitutions 
which inform constitutional politics and citizens’ activities.  Some 
                                                             
39
  CHENYANG LI, THE CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HARMONY 12–13 (2014). 
40
  This Confucian Classic is extensively explored by a Yale constitutional law professor, see 
JACK M. BALKIN, THE LAWS OF CHANGE: I CHING AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (2009). 
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concrete constitutional rules may be irrelevant to the practice of the 
authoritarian systems and the daily lives of the citizens.  However, the 
operation of the whole authoritarian polity is inevitably driven by the 
constitutionally-codified fundamental aspirations, although these 
aspirations may be imposed by authoritarian leaders.  For example, 
although a Vietnamese citizen may not be aware of a concrete 
constitutional provision on a certain right, or a Vietnamese political 
leader may not be aware of a specific constitutional rule on state 
structure, the whole Vietnamese community is inevitably affected by the 
fundamental commitment to socialist aspirations codified in the nation’s 
constitution.   
Fundamental constitutional commitments of authoritarian regimes 
may have the intention to limit the state power.  They may be specific 
and disharmonic with generic constitutionalist aspirations.  Socialist 
constitutional systems have been constructed on the base of specific 
kinds of underlying constitutional ideas and principles, and by that, they 
acquire distinctive constitutional identity.  The disharmony between 
generic and specific aspirations is an important source of constitutional 
identity change in socialist polities.  The gap between socialist and global 
constitutional aspirations engenders efforts to bridge this gap.  Therefore, 
to understand the dynamics of constitutional identity in socialist states, it 
is important to explore the disharmony between specific socialist 
constitutional aspirations and generic constitutionalism.  I call this 
normative constitutional disharmony.  All in all, constitutional identity 
change is animated by the universal constitutional condition presented by 
three elements, namely internal, external, and normative constitutional 
disharmonies.   
C. Constitutional Globalization 
Tushnet argues that the globalization of constitutional law is 
inevitable due to top-down pressures (the emergence of global networks 
of constitutional judges, the involvement of transnational 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in national constitutional 
matters, the incorporation of international human rights treaties into 
national constitutions, and transnational migration of workers) and 
bottom-up pressures (competitions among nations for investment and 
human capital).
41
  Constitutional globalization is also driven by a bottom-
up factor having less to do with material calculation: constitutional 
disharmony.   
                                                             
41
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Constitutional disharmony is crucial to the inevitable constitutional 
globalization.  Jacobsohn contends that: “This disharmonic 
jurisprudential context establishes the incentives, opportunities, and costs 
inhering in the practice of looking abroad for interpretive inspiration.”42  
Consequently, local actors may engage in transnational and global 
dialogue in defining constitutional meanings and constitutional identity.
43
  
But this is not necessarily limited to constitutional interpretation.  
Domestic constitutional disharmony incentivizes social and institutional 
actors to look into the pool of global ideas and experiences to seek 
constitutional consistency by formal constitution-making, as the case of 
South Africa indicates.
44
  Especially in developing countries, the gap 
between national constitutions and global standards of constitutionalism 
creates the incentives and opportunities for looking abroad for 
constitution-making or constitutional amendment.   
While the global spread of constitutional ideas is inevitable, these 
ideas are situated within the local context and balanced with local ideas.  
Tushnet states, “Every society's law is tied to so many aspects of that 
society—its politics, its particular history, its intellectual life, the 
institutional forms in which its activities are conducted, and many 
more.”45  Constitutional law is particularly prominent in this regard.  
Saunders underlines: “Constitutions are inherently local instruments.  
They must respond to local needs and they must be ‘owned’ both by the 
people of the state concerned and by their political leaders from time to 
time.”46  So, global constitutional ideas are balanced in the local context.  
Jacobsohn argues that global constitutional norms “need to be reconciled 
with the particularistic commitments of local traditions and practices; the 
contours of constitutional identity will, to a large extent, reflect how 
these disharmonies get resolved.”47  The consequence is the interaction 
and balancing of global/local constitutional identities.   
D. Dialogical Change of Constitutional Identity 
For Jacobsohn, constitutional identity is formulated and evolves 
through “dialogical enterprises” comprising “interpretive and political 
activity” occurring in public and private domains.48  Courts are the 
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principal, but not exclusive, shapers and articulators of constitutional 
identity.
49
  A wide range of actors (the courts, legislature, executive, and 
the people) engage in constitutional dialogue in the determination and 
clarification of substantial constitutional meanings and constitutional 
identities.
50
  This argument is supported by the theories of popular 
constitutionalism developed by American constitutionalists, such as 
Tushnet and Larry Kramer.
51
  However, as Heinz Klug rightly comments, 
“judicial decisions remain at the core of Jacobsohn's empirical 
analysis.”52  Jacobsohn’s theory is informed by constitutional experience 
in stable, liberal polities where judicial review operates as the mechanism 
of constitutional change.  Consequently, he has not yet accounted for the 
possibility of a non-judicial dialogical mechanism of change in 
constitutional identity.   
In the socialist nations where judicial review is absent, 
constitutional change is normally undertaken through formal 
constitution-making and constitutional amendment.  Especially, the 
moment of constitution-making creates space for constitutional dialogue 
among different political actors.  The theory of the disharmonic 
constitution therefore must incorporate constitutional dialogue during the 
moment of formal constitutional change.  Constitutional dialogue in such 
moments does not feature the way in which the dialogical interaction of 
judges with other political actors elaborates the meanings of the existing 
constitution.  Rather, it features the way in which the dialogical 
interaction of the public and the government envisage the meaning of a 
normative constitution or a desirable constitutional order by taking the 
existing constitution as a starting foil.  The constitutional disharmony 
operates as the condition of the dynamics of constitutional dialogue. 
Furthermore, like Vicki Jackson
53
 and David Law,
54
 Jacobsohn 
tends to focus on judicial engagement in transnational dialogue.  But 
there is also transnational engagement in constitution-making.  Foreign 
and global sources are important for developing countries, like socialist 
countries, creating their constitutional identity by bridging the 
disharmonic gap between nation-specific constitutional identity and 
generic constitutional identity.  But this need not take place by judicial 
engagement, as judicial review of constitutional questions is absent in 
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contemporary socialist countries.  Alternatively, the constitution-making 
process allows political actors, constitution-makers, and social actors to 
engage in a transnational constitutional dialogue in which global and 
local sources disharmoniously interact and balance, provoking change in 
constitutional identity. 
II. SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
Before considering the change to socialist constitutional identity, it 
is necessary to briefly introduce its common core.
55
  The specific socialist 
constitutional identities are sharply disharmonic with the aspirations of 
global constitutionalism.   
A. Constitutional Instrumentalism 
In global constitutionalism, a constitution is conceived as the 
document of the people, which establishes written legal limitations on the 
public power.
56
  This is philosophically underpinned by the social 
contract theories of the Enlightenment era.
57
  All socialist countries have 
a document called a constitution, but these socialist documents are self-
understood not as the legal limitations upon the governmental power but 
as an instrument of the party-state to structuralize and aggrandize its 
power so as to control and direct the society toward achieving the 
socialist goals.  Simply speaking, while constitutionalism conceives of 
constitutions as a tool for the people to control the state, socialist 
constitutional instrumentalism uses constitutions as the tool for the state 
to control the people.  All of the contemporary socialist countries have a 
written constitution that are often amended and replaced to suit the 
changes in ideology, policy, and leadership of a communist party.   
B.  Constitutional Vanguardism 
In generic constitutionalism, “the will of the people is the source of 
authority and the basis of legitimate government.”58  Legitimate power is 
created through free and equal election.  Differently, the use of the public 
power in the socialist world is constitutionally pre-established as the 
prerogative of the communist party conceived as the “vanguard” force of 
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the working class, the ruling class in the socialist word.
59
  The concept of 
vanguardism is attributed to V.I. Lenin, according to which “real power 
lay with the Communist Party.”60  Consequently, constitution, law, state, 
and the society are all under the control of the communist party.  The 
communist party therefore is different from political parties in a liberal 
democracy.  It is not a private political organization created to compete 
for power through free election because its monopoly of power has been 
established as a reality and mandated in the constitution.  Rather, the 
communist party is an essential component of the polity, created with the 
aspiration to control the state and the society, and to direct the polity 
toward socialism.
61
  The leadership of the communist party remains the 
core of constitutional identity of the five contemporary socialist 
countries.   
C. “Democratic Centralism” 
The separation of power and checks and balances are normally 
conceived as the global identity of constitutionalism.
62
  In the socialist 
world, there are also three legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
practiced by three different state bodies.  But, the socialist constitutional 
structure is created according to a distinctive socialist principle called 
“democratic centralism,” an antithesis of the Montesquieuian tripartite 
government.  Initially, “democratic centralism” was introduced by V.I. 
Lenin as the principle of party activity.  Simply speaking, it aims to 
combine “democratic” discussions and centralized actions.  After 
“democratic discussion,” superiors will issue a “conclusion” or order 
which requires unquestioning obedience from the inferiors.
63
  
“Democratic centralism” was then applied in state organization and 
actions, rendered as “unity of power” as opposed to the separation of 
power.  It is constitutionally characterized by the idea that state power is 
centralized in the popularly elected representative body.  Within this 
formal scheme of united power, all other state bodies are subordinate to 
the supreme legislature.  In this socialist constitutional arrangement, 
labor divisions among the three state organs are possible, but they must 
work together.  This arrangement rejects the separation of power and 
checks and balances as these will weaken the power and prevent power 
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cooperation.  The constitutional structure in the contemporary socialist 
world retains this identity of unitary and centralized power.   
 
D. Rights Statism   
Constitutionalism conceives of universal human rights as limits of 
the use of the public power.
64
  Socialist constitutions also include rights 
provisions, defined by a statist conceptualization of rights.
65
  Statist rights 
are underpinned by Marxist legal positivism, constitutional 
instrumentalism, and historical materialism.  Marxist legal positivism 
leads to the idea that rights are positively granted by the state.  Marxist 
constitutional instrumentalism suggests that rights are not the limits on 
the state but instead can be limited by the state for the state’s purposes.  
Historical materialism justifies the social determination of rights.  The 
Constitutions of the five contemporary socialist countries include rights 
provisions in the line of statism.   
E. Economic Statism 
The protection of property rights is now considered an essential 
element of global constitutionalism.
66
  Moreover, the market economy is 
the worldwide practice, the condition of a well-functioning constitutional 
government.
67
 Socialist countries, however, have a distinctive 
constitutional economy, which rests on the assumption that to achieve 
socialism, the state needs to centrally plan the working of the economy 
and control substantial economic resources like lands and other 
properties.  The consequence of this economic statism is the state-owned 
economy in the socialist world.
68
  This remains as the essential feature of 
the five contemporary socialist countries. 
III. A CASE-STUDY: VIETNAM 
A. Constitutional Disharmony 
By way of background, Vietnam has enacted five constitutions 
under the leadership of the Communist Party: the 1946 Constitution after 
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the August Revolution; the 1959 Constitution in North Vietnam after the 
Geneva Conference dividing Vietnam into two separate zones; the 1980 
Constitution after national unification; the 1992 Constitution after the 
1986 Đổi mới (Renovation) initiative; and most recently the 2013 
Constitution in the context of the nation’s active integration into the 
global economic and political order.
69
  The first constitution was more 
liberal, while the four later were influenced by socialist constitutional 
tradition.  After the first amendment in 2001, the party-state again 
introduced a plan to revise the 1992 Constitution in 2011, but eventually 
replaced it with the new 2013 Constitution.  This new Constitution 
presents important adaptive changes to the core of socialist constitutional 
identity which is conditioned by the disharmony internal to and 
surrounding the 1992 Constitution.   
The 1992 Constitution was enacted in response to the Đổi mới 
program initiated by the Party in 1986, which was meant to transform the 
centrally planned economy into the “socialist-oriented market economy.”  
The Constitution continued but began to modify the essence of socialist 
constitutional identity.  Notably, it introduced competing visions which 
promoted both economic liberalization and socialist orientation.  It 
recognized the role of private economic sectors, indicative of the 
adaption of the socialist specific identity, namely, the state-owned 
economy, by incorporating generic liberal values.
70
  In practice, Vietnam 
implemented the “socialist-oriented market economy” in nearly three 
decades on the framework established by the 1992 Constitution.  The 
Constitution also included provisions which facilitated global political 
and economic integration and at the same time removed the commitment 
to exclusive diplomatic relationships with socialist nations.
71
  In practice, 
Vietnam has established diplomatic relationships with 186 nations 
throughout the world
72
 and joined major international economic 
institutions like the World Trade Organization (2007).
73
 
 New Institutional Economics suggests that a market economy 
(even socialist oriented) requires the rule of law, limited government, and 
the protection of human rights, especially economic rights.
74
  Hence, new 
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constitutional provisions facilitating economic reform were adopted 
together with the revised institutional setting.  The Leninist unitary 
constitutional structure continued but was modified to make the power 
less concentrated: the government was vested with more independent 
administrative authorities; the prime minister had more individual 
authorities and responsibilities; and the individual presidency was 
established.
75
  The 1992 Constitution also introduced for the first time the 
term of “human rights” understood as being expressed in “the right of 
citizens.”76  The constitutional amendments in 2001 introduced the idea 
of the “socialist rule of law state.”  This was an attempt to marry the 
specific socialist legality, a socialist form of rule by law, with the western 
concept of the rule of law. 
 Consequently, the 1992 Constitution was a disharmonic 
constitution.  Internally, it remained a socialist document but included 
competing understandings of market economy, human rights, and rule of 
law.  Most importantly, the constitutional enshrinement of the idea of the 
rule of law state has precipitated more substantial reformist discourse.  
The idea of the socialist rule of law state is an ambiguous one.  The 
ambiguous language of the socialist rule of law state opens the door for 
alternative interpretations.  The concept of “socialist rule of law state” 
has operated as the epistemic foil for reformist constitutional discourse in 
early twentieth century Vietnam.  A member of the Constitutional 
Amendment Committee told me that one of the reasons for the enactment 
of the new 2013 Constitution was the development of the “social 
cognition of the rule of law state.”77 
  The commitment to the socialist rule of law state has stipulated 
new visions on law, state power, rights, and public institutional 
arrangements.  Since the introduction of the concept of socialist rule of 
law state in 2001 in the Constitution, there have been creative efforts 
among political leaders, officials, and legal scholars, as well as other 
public intellectuals.  These creative efforts have focused on the 
construction of its substantial meanings and reforming arguments 
pertaining to party leadership, state institutions, limiting arbitrary power, 
constitutional review, human rights protection, and judicial independence 
within that framework.
78
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 Externally, the 1992 Constitution includes many constitutional 
aspirations (such as human rights protection and construction of the rule 
of law state) that are disharmonic to the social reality (such as human 
rights restrictions and corruption).  The Constitution also includes several 
fundamental commitments, such as “building a prosperous life for its 
people, a strong country and an equitable, democratic and civilised  
society, ensuring the well-being, freedom and happiness of all citizens as 
well as conditions for their all-round development” (Article 3), which are 
discordant with the reality in Vietnam of a developing country with many 
people living in poor conditions, especially the rural population which 
occupied 66% of the total population by 2015.
79
  These conditions 
encourage a continuous struggle to close the gap between constitutional 
commitments and reality.   
 Normatively, the 1992 Constitution is dissonant with global 
requirements of constitutionalism in many points (such as the 
instrumentalist constitution, the leadership of the communist party, 
centralized power, individual rights, and the economy controlled by the 
state).  These constitutional gaps provide the space for, and incentivize 
different actors to, struggle for constitutional consistency.  To illustrate, 
constitutional law Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung at Vietnam National 
University Law School at Hanoi criticizes the 1992 Constitution for 
failing to meet the normative requirements of generic constitutionalism.  
Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung draws on Louis Henkin to define these 
requirements as limited government, whose requirements include: 
constitution-making by a constitutional convention or special procedures, 
the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the protection of 
human rights.
80
  He then advocates that: “To have an authentic 
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constitution, we must have ‘constitutionalism.’  Simply speaking, 
‘constitutionalism’ is the necessary theory which serves as the base for 
constitution-making and amending the authentic constitution.”81  
In short, the adaptive change to the socialist constitutional identity 
in Vietnam is animated by the universal condition of constitutional 
disharmony.  The 1992 Constitution is a disharmonic constitution, giving 
rise to a socialist constitutional identity culminating in the adaptions 
embodied in the new 2013 Constitution.   
B. Constitutional Globalization  
This section considers the impact of constitutional globalization on 
constitution-making and constitutional discourse in Vietnam in 2013.  I 
met and exchanged with some constitution-makers during this time and 
further interviewed them Hanoi in January 2017.  During my interviews, 
constitution-makers mentioned to me several global factors that resulted 
in constitution-making in Vietnam, including international economic 
integration, Vietnam’s ratification of international human rights treaties, 
and the globalization of Vietnamese legal scholarship.
82
  They said that 
Vietnam needs to reform the constitutional system to better integrate into 
the global community.
83
  The Party even instructed constitution-makers 
to reference foreign constitutional experience.
84
  The internal 
contradiction of the 1992 Constitution, the gap between this socialist 
constitution and social reality, and especially the gap between this charter 
and normative requirements of global constitutionalism, creates 
incentives, spaces, and chances for different actors to turn to global 
sources for constitution-making inspirations to achieve more 
constitutional consistency.   
In fact, general ideas of global constitutionalism have been 
diffused in Vietnam by various channels.  One such channel has been the 
translation of enlightenment thinkers’ work into Vietnamese.  Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of 
The Laws have been republished and referenced more often in the 
2010s.
85
  In addition, the new century features publication for the first 
time in Vietnamese of works by other western liberal thinkers, such as 
John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, and John Stuart Mill’s 
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Considerations on Representative Government and On Liberty.
86
  The 
publication of these books in the Vietnamese language is instrumental to 
Soviet-trained senior constitutional scholars and Vietnamese-trained 
scholars in gaining access to western liberalist ideas, which inspire them 
to envisage new ideas on the constitution, rights, and the public power.  
Consequently, as will be discussed below, the constitutional intellectuals 
advocate for a contractual constitution, constitutional referendum, natural 
rights, and the separation of power, which are characteristically 
predicated on European enlightenment liberalism, which challenges the 
established socialist constitutional understanding.   
Translation work has also resulted in the impact of American 
liberal constitutionalism on the Vietnamese constitutional intellectual 
life.  The Vietnamese version of the Federalist Papers has been 
increasingly referenced.
87
  Additionally, the twenty-first century 
witnessed publications in Vietnamese of Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America
88
 and James Madison's Notes On the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787.
89
  The Embassy of the United States in Hanoi also publishes 
Vietnamese translations of informational work on modern 
constitutionalism and the American constitutional system.
90
  The 
particular consequences of the influence of American constitutionalism in 
Vietnamese constitutional intellectual life are the constitutional proposals 
of constitutional limitations, constitutional endurance, constituent power 
and constitutional convention, and judicial review.  American 
constitutionalism is also referenced in other constitutional discourse 
regarding the separation of power, human rights, and judicial 
independence. 
In addition to legal translation, the development of legal education 
is another factor conducive to the diffusion of generic constitutional ideas 
in Vietnam.  Young Vietnamese constitutionalists and lawyers trained 
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either in European universities (such as France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) or American law schools play an especially important role 
in the diffusion of new constitutional ideas in Vietnam.
91
  They are 
competent in foreign languages, particularly English, which is 
instrumental to their imbibing and disseminating western and global 
ideas.  Their exchanges and publications in Vietnamese buttress senior 
constitutionalists’ support of western and global ideas.  As Mark Sidel 
states, Vietnamese constitutional scholars “have also explored theory and 
constitutional development in Europe, North America, Asia, and 
elsewhere.”92  The publications of constitutionalists and lawyers in 
Vietnam have helped spread the constitutional government ideas and 
practices of major western nations.
93
  Western liberal constitutionalism 
informs new discourse in Vietnam on popular sovereignty, separation of 
power, checks and balances, constitutional review, human rights, and 
judicial independence.  Many Vietnamese constitutional intellectuals 
invoke western liberal constitutional experiences in different ways.  
Importantly, Vietnamese constitutional intellectuals now no longer work 
purely within the four walls of academia.  They have engaged in 
constitutional dialogues with local legislators and constitution-makers, 
which precipitates the pluralization of their constitutional thinking.  
Workshops and conferences on constitutional issues have not been purely 
academic: law-makers and constitution-makers have often been invited to 
attend these fora and exchanged ideas with scholars.
94
  
  Global constitutional ideas have also been diffused in Vietnam 
through transnational dialogues, especially the dialogues on human 
rights.  International human rights laws (particularly, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) are important to the change of Vietnamese 
comprehension of human rights from a specific to a more cosmopolitan 
posture.  Both constitution-makers and public intellectuals accept the idea 
that constitutional rights in Vietnam must be consistent with international 
human rights treaties that Vietnam has signed.
95
  The Vietnamese 
government has also engaged in transnational human rights dialogues 
with international bodies like the UN Human Rights Committee and with 
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the United States, the European Community, Australia, and Canada.
96
  
The dialogical interactions with foreign leaders in transitional fora have 
further engendered disharmonic visions on human rights: the socialist 
specific and the universalist understandings of human rights.   
International legal aid programs also contribute to the diffusion of 
global constitutional ideas in Vietnam.  As evidence of the new 
movement of “law and development,”97 the United Nations Development 
Programme in Vietnam and some European governments have supported 
organizing a number of workshops on constitutional revision issues, 
which have created the platform for Vietnamese legislators, constitution-
makers, domestic scholars, and international scholars to exchange 
constitutional ideas.  Through this dialogical platform, global 
constitutional ideas have affected the thinking of local legislators, 
constitution-makers, and intellectuals, facilitating the emergence of 
alternative constitutional ideas.   
Globalization has engendered what social science scholars call 
“social complexity.”98  A social system becomes significantly complex 
“when there are strong interactions among its elements, so that current 
events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later 
events.”99  Social scientists point out that: “Social complexity generated 
by globalization and rapid economic change compels both the state and 
citizens to step outside pre-existing identities and change their thinking 
about which groups matter most and which groups matter least.”100  
Turning to the case of Vietnam, Gillespie demonstrates that the 
implementation of the Renovation program and the country’s integration 
into the global community have generated social complexity in Vietnam 
and stimulated the change of legal ideas.
101
  He concludes:  
Economic reforms, socialization, and globalization have 
brought about rapid changes in most facets of Vietnamese 
life.  New ideas compete with old, creating contradictory 
and sometimes confusing public discourse.  Modernization 
theory suggests that the party-state might respond to this 
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complexity by expanding its loyalties to encompass new 
social groups and ideas.
102
  
An Assembly deputy who is deeply engaged in the constitution-
making process told me that the enactment of the 2013 Constitution is a 
response to “the development of people’s recognition,” which reflects 
different understandings.
103
  Although the party-state in Vietnam has 
persisted in political monism, social complexity has compelled it to 
respond to pluralist ideas, pluralist interests, and demands of different 
social forces by accommodating alternative constitutional values.  The 
consequence is the dialogical process of constitutional dynamics in 
Vietnam.  Socialist ideas dialogically interact with global ideas.  The 
party-state and the public have engaged in a constitutional dialogue to 
redefine and adjust fundamental constitutional aspirations that will guide 
the future development of the polity.  This allows socialist constitutional 
identity to evolve.   
C. Dialogical Change of Socialist Constitutional Identity 
In Vietnam, judicial review is absent, and constitutional dialogue 
proceeds in popular and political fora.  Even in ordinary politics, despite 
the state’s management, there are spaces for public discourse in which 
constitutional meanings and constitutional identity are defined and 
clarified.  But the extraordinary moment of constitution-making offers 
great space for constitutional dialogue.  In 2013, constitution-makers 
actively discussed substantive constitutional questions, the National 
Assembly’s members had different views, and they listened to the 
contentious debates among the public.
104
  Disharmonic constitution-
making functions as a forum for the party, the state, and the people to 
debate, contest, define, clarify, and develop the meanings and the 
contents of the Vietnamese constitutional identity.  This dialogical 
constitution-making allows competing constitutional visions to emerge.  
In that forum, socialist and global constitutional vision engages in a 
conversation, although its outcome is decided by the socialist leadership.   
The disharmonic nature of the 1992 Constitution creates the 
condition for continuing constitutional debates, which eventually 
culminated in a new round of constitution-making in 2013.  The three-
year (2011–2013) constitution-making process involved a constitutional 
dialogue in which the party-state, legislators, constitution-makers, 
intellectuals, lawyers, activists, and others had controversially deliberated 
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on substantial constitutional issues.
105
  Socialist constitutional identity is 
articulated, modified, and developed through constitutional dialogue in 
which different actors advocate alternative socialist and global 
constitutional visions.  This is examined in detail below.   
1.   Constitutional Instrumentalism 
The social contract theories were introduced in Vietnam by early 
Vietnamese constitutionalists.
106
  Hồ Chí Minh’s 1945 decree on 
constitution-making also adopted this view.
107
  The 1946 Constitution 
incarnates this conception to some extent: its preamble acknowledges 
that the Vietnamese people are the author of the Constitution.
108
  The 
contractual concept, however, was repudiated by the subsequent 1959, 
1980, and 1992 socialist Constitutions, and class instrumentalism then 
dominated the Vietnamese understanding of the nature of the 
constitution.
109
  In the 2000s, however, classical social contract theories 
witnessed a return in Vietnamese legal discourse.  Especially around the 
wave of the constitution-making process in the 2010s, constitutional 
contractualism was a prevailing model for conceptualizing the nature of 
the constitution as discussed below.    
Contractualism is espoused by not only younger constitutionalists 
but also senior Soviet-trained constitutional law scholars.
110
  To illustrate, 
criticizing the class understanding of constitution as flawed, Professor 
Đào Trí Úc, a senior legal scholar, opines that the constitution is the 
“legal contract of different social forces” and “the legal foundation of the 
entire society which recognizes and embodies the interests of the entire 
society, [and] the general interests of the people and the nation, although 
it always counts for the interests and the will of the leading class of the 
society in different historical periods.”111  Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung 
presents a more radical shift to contractualism, evident in his numerous 
writings during the constitution-making process.  To cite an example, 
invoking Rousseau and Thomas Paine, he suggested that the future 
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Constitution in Vietnam should be conceived of as a social contract 
reflecting the general will of the people, and a product of the people, not 
the government.
112
  Contractualism also informs the constitutional 
commentaries of other Soviet-trained legal scholars.
113
  The contractual 
constitution was ardently hailed by the Vietnamese public.  Official mass 
media enlivened the idea of contractual constitution by approvingly 
disseminating it from the academic to popular fora.
114
  Furthermore, 
popular constitutional petitions were strongly influenced by the idea of a 
contractual constitution.
115
 
As the consequence of the concept of contractual constitution, 
legal scholars, lawyers, senior officials, legislators, members of the 
government, and retired politicians as well as members of civil society, 
activists, and dissidents vehemently called for the people as the 
constitutional author and popular ratification of a new Constitution.
116
  
According to a reporter, “despite in different fora and in different time, 
there is a convergence among many comments on the draft amendments 
to the 1992 Constitution on vesting the constitution-making power to the 
people.”117  To illustrate, in a public meeting, a commentator named 
Nguyễn Hữu Chót stated:   
The nature of our state is the state of the people, by the 
people, and for the people, confirmed in Article 2 of the 
[1992] Constitution . . . the practice of constitution-making 
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through indirect democracy (through the National 
Assembly) as the current practice somewhat limits the 
people’s power and does not [reflect] the will and the desire 
of the people.  Therefore, the Constitution must be amended 
to make the constituent power [belong] to the people 
through referendum.
118
  
It can be seen that the intellectual community and society understood the 
nature of the Constitution in the new contractual line.  Intellectuals do 
realize that this is a new understanding.  To illustrate, a senior intellectual 
named Phan Hữu Dật comments:  
Formerly, there were people who understood that the 
National Assembly is the supreme organ in our country 
which possesses all legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers.  Nowadays, there is a deeper and wider 
understanding that the people are the supreme organ, which 
stemmed from the recognition of the force of the people and 
the people as the base of every enterprise. . . . That means 
the new Constitution must guarantee the people’s right to 
vote in referendum.  Actually, this understanding is just a 
return to the spirit and words of the 1946 Constitution of our 
country.
119
 
It is reported that: “During the deliberation at the National Assembly in 
late 2012, some delegates suggested that after being approved by the 
National Assembly, the Constitution must be voted in a referendum to be 
valid.  Referendum must be determined in the Constitution as a citizen’s 
fundamental rights.”120  My interviews also indicate that constitution-
makers adopted a new understanding that the nature of the constitution is 
the expression of the popular will, not merely the Party’s creed.121  The 
Government also agrees: “It is necessary to determine that the constituent 
power is the expression of the people’s supreme power, including the 
powers to initiate constitution-making, to participate in the constitutional 
drafting process, and finally to ratify [the constitution] in a 
referendum.”122  
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This new understanding about the nature of the constitution and 
constitutional authorship is significantly different from the Soviet 
constitutional instrumentalism.  The state has begun to understand the 
constitution as something belonging to the people and reflecting the 
public will, rather than merely instrumental to its own interests.  This 
understanding reflects the initial convergence with generic constitutional 
identity, a modification to the conventional instrumentalist recognition. 
The regime’s new understanding of the nature of the constitution 
also informs the reality of constitution-making to a certain extent.  As I 
have illustrated in length elsewhere, the 2013 constitution-making 
process has encouraged the most participation and has been the most 
open process in Vietnam.
123
 The Constitution and its formation is not 
merely the instrument of the party-state but becomes the base for the 
constitutional dialogue between the party-state and the people.  This 
constitutional dialogue also involves the exchange of ideas and opinions 
about the nature of the constitution itself.  In addition to practical actors, 
an open constitutional conversation could happen in Vietnam under the 
communist rule because there is a new understanding of the democratic 
nature of constitution among the society and the party-state.   
That said, the regime does not abandon the instrumentalist identity 
of the socialist constitution.  The party-state continues to conceive of the 
constitution as the instrument to express the party’s policies in 
constitutional terms.
124
  In reality, despite the open constitutional 
dialogue, the party-state rejected most popular constitutional 
submissions, suggestions, and petitions, including the call for 
constitutional referendum, and imposed its constitutional references at 
the last minute.
125
  
Consequently, the new 2013 constitution continues to confirm the 
instrumentalist essence of the socialist constitution, but incorporates new 
ideas reflecting a commitment to a democratic constitution.  This is best 
expressed in its new preamble: “Institutionalizing the Political Creed of 
Building the Nation during period of Transition to Socialism, and 
inheriting the 1946 Constitution, 1959 Constitution, 1980 Constitution, 
and 1992 Constitution, the Vietnamese People frame, implement, and 
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protect this Constitution for the objectives of wealthy people, powerful 
nation, democracy, justice, and civilization.”126  On the one hand, the 
Constitution expressly acknowledges that it is enacted to institutionalize 
the Party’s socialist directions.  On the other hand, the global language of 
“we the people” is employed to establish the commitment to popular 
constituent authorship.
127
  So, the Constitution reflects the dissonant 
tension between the socialist instrumentalist and the generic 
understanding of the nature of the Constitution as the document of the 
people.   
Moreover, the Constitution is conceived as an instrument for 
structuring the public power.  On the other hand, constitution-makers 
tend to subject the state to constitutional constraints: “The State is 
organized and operates in concordance with the Constitution and the law, 
governs the society by the Constitution and the law.”128  This is further 
strengthened by the new requirement of constitutional oath taken by 
senior politicians.
129
  
Disharmony internal to, and surrounding, the 1992 Constitution led 
to the identity adaption of constitutional instrumentalism in Vietnam.  
First, the move to constitutional contractualism is animated by the gap 
between the 1992 Constitution and the normative requirement of 
constitutionalism regarding constitutional authorship.  That the 
Constitution stipulates that the legislature possess the constitution-
making power is inconsistent with the ideal of people’s constitution-
making power, and this animates the struggle for consistency.  Second, 
the adaption to the instrumentalist identity of the Vietnamese 
Constitution is animated by the ambiguity and contradiction internal to 
the 1992 Constitution regarding the nature of the constitution and 
constituent power.  The 1992 Constitution declared that it was the 
“supreme law” of the state,130 but it was in fact enacted by an ordinary 
legislature (the National Assembly) and provided that this legislature has 
both law-making and constitution-making power,
131
 which is discordant 
with the provision on constitutional supremacy.  This dissonance 
animated the discourse on contractual constitution and constitutional 
referendum, which attempts to establish the constitution as the true 
supreme law of the land because the constituent power is vested in the 
people.  Third, the reemergence of constitutional contractualism is 
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animated by the gap between constitution-making power in paper and in 
reality.  In Vietnam, the legislature is the supreme body of constitution-
making power in text, but the Party is possessor of the constitution-
making power in reality.  Constitution-making is initiated, controlled, and 
concluded by the Party.  So, the call for people’s ratification of the 
Constitution implicitly aims to curtail the Party’s power in constitution-
making and vest it into the hands of the people, or at least demonstrates 
an unsatisfactory disposition toward instrumentalist identity of the 
socialist constitution.    
These constitutional disharmonies create the incentive for the turn 
to global sources.  The global idea of contractual constitution is diffused 
in Vietnam and informs the domestic discourse on the nature of the 
constitution and constituent power.  However, this global idea is situated 
in the local context.  The public intellectuals and citizens draw from a 
wide range of sources to formulate a new understanding of the nature of 
the constitution: classical theories of social contract, foreign experiences, 
nationalist sources, and local political ideology.  First, the call for 
contractual constitution in Vietnam is informed by social contract 
theories.  Second, the world practice of constitutional referendum was 
also invoked to justify its practice in Vietnam.
132
  Third, the legacy of the 
1946 Constitution was often summoned to legitimatize popular 
constitution-making, as its provision of constitutional referendum is 
conceived as the embodiment of the idea of social contract and the 
principle of popular sovereignty.
133
  Finally, the Party’s rhetoric of “the 
state of the people, by the people, and for the people,” was also 
vindicated for this purpose.  So, there is a balance between global and 
local source in the formulation of the new understanding of the nature of 
the constitution and constituent power.   
The 2013 constitution-making process operated as the mechanism 
through which politicians, officials, lawyers, legal scholars, public 
intellectuals, and citizens engaged in a critical dialogue about the nature 
of the Constitution.  This constitutional dialogue was influential enough 
to generate the modification of the regime’s instrumentalist 
understanding of the nature of the Constitution.  The birth of the new 
2013 Constitution is conceived as the “landmark in the development of 
understanding about the Constitution in Vietnam” and “the base for the 
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continuous renovation of the understanding about the constitution.”134  
Constitution-makers believe Vietnam’s understanding of the Constitution 
is now closer to “international standard of a modern constitution.”135  The 
language of the new 2013 Constitution indicates a modified 
understanding on the instrumentalist essence of the socialist constitution 
in Vietnam.  The new commitment to popular constitutional authorship is 
reflective of the critical dialogue between the public and the party-state 
on the nature of the Constitution and constituent power.   
2.   Constitutional Vanguardism 
The 1946 Constitution was enacted by a multi-party constituent 
assembly, albeit under the leadership of the Communist Party, and did 
not have any provision about this Party.  The 1959 Constitution referred 
to the leadership of the Party in its preamble.
136
  The 1980 Constitution 
firmly mandated the exclusive leadership of the Party in Article 4.
137
  
Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution continued to provide for the party 
leadership but this leadership was not exclusive, reading as follows: “The 
Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working 
class and loyal representative of the interests of the working class, the 
working people and the whole nation, who adheres to Marxism-Leninism 
and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, is the force assuming leadership of the State 
and society.”138 Article 4 was then described as the sacrosanct gospel and 
was taboo in constitutional discussion in Vietnam for many years.   
However, during the 2013 constitution-making process, the party-
state, public intellectuals, dissidents, and the senior members of the Party 
participated in a critical dialogue to redefine the meaning of party 
leadership.  At the extreme level, radical liberals, dissidents, and even 
retired Party’s members imputed the shortcoming of the communist 
party’s leadership to the lack of political competitions and the checks and 
balances among different political forces.
139
  They, therefore, called for a 
radical change in constitutional identity by establishing a multi-party 
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system.  To illustrate, a petition initiated by seventy-two intellectuals, 
many of whom are party-members, called for free elections and political 
competition, implying a multi-party system.
140
  
In a public letter,  Lê Hiếu Đằng—a lawyer and party member, who 
worked for a long time in the Vietnam Father Front (the political 
organization closely tied to the Communist Party)—eventually called for 
creation of a “Democratic and Social Party” to compete with the 
Communist Party, which triggered wide attention.
141
  He reasoned that 
economic development would create different social groups who would 
form different organizations to protect their interests.
142
  “This is the 
natural trend, and therefore a multi-party system is indisputable, and 
Article 4 of the Constitution is senseless.”143  He also commented on the 
legal base for creating an alternative party: “The policy of no multi-party 
system is the policy of the Communist Party.  There is not any law 
prohibiting this.”144  He then suggests that the party members who no 
longer want to be the party’s members can “declare the abandonment of 
the [Communist] Party and create a new party, like the Democratic and 
Social Party.”145  Lê Hiếu Đằng publicly declared himself to be an 
apostate in December 2013, shortly before he passed away.
146
  
The proponents of a multi-party system do not repudiate the role of 
the Communist Party, but instead insist that if the Party aspires to lead 
the state and the society on the legitimate base, it must participate in 
equal political competitions through free elections and be checked and 
balanced by other parties.  An incumbent senior official agreed with the 
creation of the new party, but stated that the new party will not oppose, 
but cooperate with, the Communist Party “to build democracy for 
Vietnam.”147 
However, the mainstream trend is not to radically change the 
constitutional identity regarding the Communist Party, but to modify it 
by reconciling the disharmony between party leadership and people’s 
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sovereignty.  To illustrate, consider the notable comment by former 
President of the National Assembly, Nguyễn Văn An.  He boldly points 
out that the party has interfered in state governance and even violated the 
Constitution.
148
  He stated that the reality that the General Secretary of 
the Party heads the Central Military Commission, the highest Party organ 
on military issues in Vietnam, is unconstitutional because the 1992 
Constitution provides that the President of State is the commander of the 
military force.  He then suggested that a law pertaining to the Party 
should be enacted to separate party leadership from state governance and 
to ensure the constitutionality and legality in the party’s action.149 
Many Party scholars share the view that the new Constitution should 
mandate the enactment of law pertaining to the Party.  This is meant to 
reconcile the disharmony between the principle of popular sovereignty 
and the principle of party leadership.  The idea is that the leadership of 
the Communist Party must be constrained by law to avoid party 
arbitrariness and to make the Party accountable to the people.  Consider, 
for example, the debate on the draft Constitution in a meeting of the 
Vietnam Father Front.
150
  A senior member named Phạm Xuân Hằng 
agrees on the constitutional mandate of the party leadership, but suggests 
that this leadership must be “guaranteed by law and defined by law” to 
ensure that the Party “is under the people’s supervision” and “is 
accountable to the people in its decisions.”151  He further underlines that: 
“This is not a new issue.  Many cadres and party members have 
expressed this thought.  In the trend of perfecting the socialist rule of law 
state, we think that this is the fundamental issue of political 
transparency.”152  Another senior member, Hoàng Thái, concedes, stating 
that: “Every organ has a law to regulate it.  The Party is the core of the 
political system but there is no law about it.  This is unacceptable.  There 
should be such law so that the Party will operate publicly and 
transparently, avoiding arbitrariness.”153  In an article published in 
official media, Bùi Đức Lại, who used to work as a senior specialist for 
the Party, suggests that the class nature and the ideological foundation of 
the Communist Party should be removed from the Constitution because 
these issues should be provided in the Party’s constitution rather than the 
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State’s Constitution.154  This is actually meant to abolish the 
constitutional establishment of Marxist ideology as the dominant 
ideology of the polity.   
Constitution-makers did receive radical suggestions, but their 
debates focused on the accountability of the Party.
155
  Consequently, the 
2013 Constitution rejects the call for a multi-party system and reaffirms 
the Party’s leadership and vanguard role in Article 4.156  But, in order to 
enhance the legitimacy of this controversial Article and assuage the 
forces which sought to introduce greater disharmonies and challenge the 
party leadership, it adopts new ambiguous commitments.  First, it 
stipulates the Party’s accountability to the public in this way: “The 
Communist Party of Vietnam maintains a close tie with the People, 
serves the People, submits to People’s supervision and is accountable to 
the People in its decisions.”157  Second, the Constitution is committed to 
the constitutionality and legality of the Party’s actions, providing that: 
“All organisations and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
operate within the framework of the Constitution and the law.”158 
However, the Constitution does not articulate mechanisms to hold the 
Party accountable to the public and check the constitutionality and 
legality of the Party’s power.  So, the commitments to the Party’s 
accountability and constitutionality, which reflected the public criticism 
and demand, are ambiguous and discordant with the persistent mandate 
of the Party’s leadership.   In particular, the constitutional aspirations of 
popular and legal checks on the Party’s power contradict the 
constitutional mandate that the Party leadership be subject to the 
supervision of the people.  
Another important development concerns Article 6 of the 
Constitution, which provides that: “The people practice the state power 
under the forms of direct democracy and indirect democracy through the 
National Assembly, the People’s Councils and other state agencies.”159 
This commitment to democracy is dissonant with the constitutionally 
established monopolist power of the Party.  However, this commitment in 
theory allows the people to check the Party’s policies embodied in the 
law through their representatives and forms of direct democracy like 
referendum. 
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The condition for the modification to the identity of vanguardism 
is that the 1992 Constitution is a disharmonic constitution.  First, the fact 
that the 1992 Constitution entrenched the leadership of the Communist 
Party is at odds with the requirement of constitutional government 
created by democratic process, like free and equal election.  Second, the 
constitutional condition for emergence of dialogue about Article 4 on the 
leadership of the Communist Party is in disharmony with the preceding 
Article 2.  Article 2 confirms the principle of popular sovereignty: “All 
power belongs to the people.”160  Third, the gap between constitutional 
commitment on party vanguardism and the social reality creates the 
opportunity for dialogue about the legitimacy and meaning of Article 4.  
The 1992 Constitution removed the confirmation of the “exclusive 
leadership” Communist Party, but the single domination of the 
Communist Party is the living constitutional norm in Vietnam as there 
are not any new parties that can be established.  This has also generated 
alternative understandings of political competition and multi-party 
election, which emerged during the constitutional consultation process.  
Moreover, while the Constitution confirms the Party as a vanguard force, 
the social reality reveals a discordant picture.  In its 2011 XI National 
Congress, the Party itself realized the gravity of its actual leadership: 
“Our nation has still confronted with numerous great challenges . . . . The 
risk of further lagging behind economically compared to many nations in 
the region and in the world is apparent.  The situation of degradation in 
political ideology, morality, and life-style of a negligible part of officials 
and party members is serious, which is closely related to the evils of 
authoritativeness, corruption, and extravagance.”161  This opened the door 
for critical discussion on the legitimacy of Article 4.  In reality, the Party 
does not merely “lead” the state but interferes in the state’s affairs, which 
engenders rethinking about the meaning of party leadership.
162
  
The above constitutional inconsistencies inspire domestic actors to 
look at global sources.  Several global ideas regarding democratic 
government, political accountability, and free and equal elections have 
been diffused in Vietnam and have complicated the disharmonic 
constitutional discussions on the Party.  However, these global ideas are 
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balanced with local conditions and intellectual sources.  For example, 
domestic corruptions among Party members are important local factors 
that drive the discourse of constitutional restraints on the Party’s power.  
Moreover, the call for free elections and a multi-party system are justified 
by both global norms and the local constitutional legacy concerning the 
1946 Constitution which embodied these norms.
163
 
Constitution-making operates as the mechanism for the party, the 
state, and the people to engage in a disharmonic constitutional dialogue 
to redefine the meaning of party leadership.  There is a dialogical 
interaction between the socialist specific principle of party vanguardism 
and the generic ideas of democracy, free election, and accountability.  
Consequently, the identity of party vanguardism remains but is modified 
by new commitments to the Party’s accountability and constitutional 
restraints on the Party.  This adaption to the identity of party 
vanguardism is reflective of the new emerging understanding about the 
Party’s leadership within Party intellectuals and society.  Practically, this 
is instrumental to reinforcing the legitimacy of the Party’s leadership.  
The continued disharmony internal to Article 4 and the continued gap 
between the commitment to the Party’s vanguard and the social reality 
(especially serious corruption among Party members) creates continually 
shifting dynamics regarding the identity of constitutional vanguardism in 
Vietnam.   
3.   “Democratic Centralism” 
The 1946 Constitution established a Montesquiean tripartite 
government, including the Government, People’s Parliament, and an 
independent judiciary.
164
  The socialist Constitutions of 1959, 1980, and 
1992 repudiated the western theory of separation of powers in favor of 
the Leninist theory of “democratic centralism,” expressed in the 
constitutional field as “concentration” or “unity” of power.165  The 
Leninist constitutional structure established by the 1992 Constitution 
included: the National Assembly, the Government, the President of State, 
the people’s courts, and the people’s procucracies.  These institutions are 
responsible for, and report to, the National Assembly as the supreme 
body.
166
  
During the centrally planned period and the early Đổi mới period 
in the 1980s, the Leninist constitutional structure in Vietnam had been 
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construed through the lens of the so-called “socialist concentration of 
power,” which holds that state power in socialist Vietnam is concentrated 
in the hands of one institution, namely the National Assembly—the 
popularly elected legislature—located at the apex of the pyramidal 
structure of power while the Government (the executive) is subordinate 
to it.
167
  The reformist discourse in the 2010s, however, moved to employ 
the nomenclatures of “unity of power” and “distribution of power.”168  
Yet, this is not simply the change of habitual use of phraseology, but 
indicates the change of substantial connotations.  The alternative 
reconstruction of “unity of power” claims that state powers cannot be 
centralized in any single institution but are “united at the people” in the 
sense that the powers are legitimately emulated from the people and are 
exercised for their general interests.
169
  So, there has been a conceptual 
shift from institutional to popular base in legitimatizing unitary power.   
The alternative interpretation of unitary power facilitates 
institutionally decentralized power, giving rise to the debate on 
“distribution of state power” conceived as “the reasonable element” of the 
Western theory of the separation of power.
170
  Constitutional law scholars 
call for clearer definition of the National Assembly as the holder of the 
legislative power, the Government as the holder of the executive power, 
and the courts as the holders of the judicial power, à la Montesquieu.
171
  
This is actually the call for eliminating the concentration of powers 
(including the executive and judicial powers) in the hands of the National 
Assembly and ensuring the independence of state institutions in 
exercising their allocated powers.  It bears noting the particular 
implication of this constitutional proposal for judicial independence, 
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which is motivated by the global discourse and practice of judicial power 
and judicial review.  The mobilization for the real judicial power 
practiced by the courts implies that the functions of constitutional 
supervision and constitutional interpretation have been misallocated to 
the National Assembly and its Standing Committee and should be 
reallocated to the judicial site.
172
  
But the most important thing in the 2013 constitutional dialogue on 
state power is the call for a new principle of “controlling the state 
power,” which mirrors the western principle of checks and balances.173  
In the 2000s, Vietnam saw special concerns of “restraining state powers” 
or “controlling state power.”174  As the reflection of the practical and 
academic demands, the Communist Party in the 11th Convention in 2011 
has remarkably introduced the new principle that: “State power is unitary 
with distribution, co-ordination, and control among state organs in 
exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers.”175  The Party has 
accepted the constitutionalist idea of inter-control of the public powers, 
an intriguing development of constitutional ideology in a single party 
polity like Vietnam.  In reflection of the party’s orientation, the 
Constitutional Proposal suggests that the future Constitution should 
clearly define the mechanism of control among state bodies in exercising 
legislative, executive and judicial powers.
176
  During the time of the 
constitution-making processes, various members of the citizenry were 
inspired by the endorsement of mechanisms for controlling state bodies 
by the party and constitution-makers.  Particularly when the draft 
constitution was released for public comments, scholars, National 
Assembly delegates, and citizens vehemently discussed different 
mechanisms for mutual control among the three branches of the state.
177
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To justify the controlling of the state power, some liberal 
constitutionalists, such as Nguyễn Đăng Dung, underlined the imperative 
to limit arbitrary power and ensure government accountability, generated 
by concern for the human inclination to abuse power.
178
  Other scholars, 
such as Trần Ngọc Đường, Đinh Xuân Thảo, and Đào Trí Úc, however, 
explain that controlling the state power stems from both negative and 
positive impetuses to limit misuse of power, and to promote effective and 
efficient state functions.
179
 This kind of discourse resonated with the 
international debate on negative and positive constitutionalism.
180
 
The purpose of controlling state power has been canvassed.  Some 
liberal constitutionalists emphasized the necessity of protecting 
individuals’ rights.181  Others are more concerned with the public 
interests, rationalizing that to ensure that the state will practice the 
delegated power for their interests, the state power must be controlled.
182
  
Alternative mechanisms for controlling the state power have been 
discussed.  The legal mechanism for controlling the state power by a 
special body of judicial review has also been hotly debated.
183
  In 
addition, a number of political mechanisms have been proposed, 
including internal mutual control among state bodies and external 
popular controls through election, removal of representatives, 
referendum, and the press.  This Vietnamese discourse on controlling the 
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state power aligns with the international debate on political and legal 
constitutionalism.
184
  
Members of the National Assembly also strongly supported the 
new principle of controlling state power but were confused about how to 
materialize it in the new constitution.
185
  A delegate agreed that the 
incorporation of the new principle of controlling state power is necessary, 
but he stated “to control whom” and “how to control” are still open 
questions.
186
  On these questions, another delegate distinguishes internal 
and external controls, “[w]e understand that internal control is the control 
practiced by state organs and external control is the control practiced by 
the people and the society.  Basically, the contents of the draft 
Constitution have properly expressed this principle.”187  But according to 
another delegate, controlling state power means control among the three 
state powers: the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
188
 
Consequently, the new Constitution continues but modifies the 
identity of the Leninist centralized constitutional structure.  On the one 
hand, it continues to reject the Montesquieu principle of separation of 
power.  This is due to the ideological practice that the party-state adheres 
to—using the principle of unity to maintain the socialist identity of the 
polity.  Moreover, that rejection also has a practical purpose.  Although 
the Communist Party can play the leading role in the separationist polity, 
it rejects the separation of powers because of the practical concern that 
separation of powers will invite greater political conflicts, which may 
lead to political maelstrom.  This is complicated by rumors about internal 
conflicts among top political leaders.
189
  In addition, the separation of 
powers may not deprive the Party power as a whole, but may threaten it 
in some respects.  For example, the Party may lose control of the 
judiciary in a separationist polity.     
On the other hand, the Constitution introduces new visions 
disharmonic with the Leninist unitary constitutional structure.  First, 
although the Constitution rejects the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
it continues the principle of “distribution of power” established by the 
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1992 Constitution and goes further to employ Montesquieu’s language to 
clearly define the public power.  For the first time, the Constitution 
clearly vests legislative power to the National Assembly, executive 
power to the Government, and judicial power to the courts.
190
  Courts 
also feature, for the first time, the constitutional function of protecting 
human rights and justice.
191
  Moreover, judicial independence is 
stipulated in the provision that: “The judges and assessors are 
independent and shall only obey the law; interference with the trials of 
the judges and assessors by bodies, organisations, and individuals is 
strictly prohibited.”192  Second, the Constitution introduces the new 
principle of mutual control among the three branches of power: “The 
state power is unified and distributed to state agencies which coordinate 
with and control one another in the exercise of the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers”.193  Although constitution-makers could not reach an 
agreement about the mechanisms of controlling state power, they 
established this as a constitutional principle and let statutes provide 
detailed mechanisms.
194
 
Disharmony in the 1992 Constitution led to modification of the 
identity of constitutional centralism.  First, the principle of unitary power 
adopted in this Constitution and its lack of institutional checks and 
balances is discordant with the normative requirement of constitutionalist 
polity in which power is separated and checked to prevent arbitrariness, 
which triggers the debate on distributed and controlled power.  Second, 
this Constitution adopted competing organizational principles: the 
principle of unity of power informed by socialist constitutional thinking 
and distribution of powers informed by western doctrine of separation of 
power.  Yet, distribution of state power has only been enshrined in the 
revised 1992 Constitution as a principle and has not yet been reified in 
concrete institutional designs.  This internal disharmony resulted in 
constitutional dialogue in the 2010s regarding a clearer definition and 
allocation of the powers of the three state branches.  Furthermore, the fact 
that the Constitution adopted competing commitments both to the rule of 
law (which implies legal restraint on the public power) and unified state 
power and party leadership (which conversely implies consolidating 
power) provides space for dialogue on distributed and controlled power. 
Third, the gap between organizational commitment and reality 
encourages dialogue on distributed and controlled power.  To illustrate, 
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while the 1992 Constitution stipulated to distributed power, in reality, the 
power is concentrated in the hands of the Party, and the National 
Assembly is the forum for the Party to centralize power.  This reality 
triggers the debate on distributed power, which is in fact meant to 
separate the Party power from the state power.  The logic is that when the 
powers of different state branches are clearly defined, the intervention of 
the Party into state activities will be limited, as state agencies will operate 
according to their autonomous constitutionally defined spheres.  In 
addition, the increasing number of serious corruption cases and similar 
public power abuses caused considerable popular dissatisfaction,
195
 
which is disharmonic with the constitutional commitment to “combating 
against corruption, misspending and all manifestations of bureaucratism, 
arrogance, and authoritarianism.”196  The call for controlled power 
reflects this social malaise.     
Those constitutional disharmonies incentivize different actors to 
seek inspiration from global sources.  The global ideas of separation of 
powers and limited government have been diffused in Vietnam and 
induce disharmonic constitutional debates.  However, these global ideas 
are situated in the local context.  The ideas of the separation of powers 
and limited power are balanced with the local ideas of unity of powers 
and cooperation of powers.  Consequently, the public power is both 
distributed and concentrated.  The National Assembly remains the 
supreme body, and independence among the state bodies, including 
judicial independence, is not encouraged.  The state bodies can mutually 
check, but they must cooperate with each other, and such aggressive 
mechanisms of checks and balances, such as the ability to veto, 
impeachment, and judicial review are not provided.   
The constitution-making process allows different actors within the 
polity to not only discuss detailed issues pertaining to institutional 
design, but also to critically rethink, redefine, and adapt constitutional 
postulates fundamental to the overall constitutional structure.  The 
socialist principle of unitary power remains the hegemonic feature of the 
regime, but it is balanced with generic ideas of separated and limited 
government.  The new Constitution is reflective of the ideational 
adjustment to constitutional structure and includes disharmonic 
commitments to unitary, distributed, and controlled power, giving rise to 
the continuous evolution of the identity of the socialist constitutional 
structure.   
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4.   Rights Statism and Universalism 
The generic idea of fundamental rights was diffused in Vietnam 
during the early twentieth century.
197
  The 1946 Constitution guaranteed 
fundamental rights familiar in Western constitutions.
198
  The subsequent 
socialist constitutions of 1959, 1980, and 1992 provided even more 
generous fundamental rights but under the influence of Marxist and 
Soviet rights statism.
199
  
During the Vietnamese constitutional dialogue in the 2010s, the 
alternative vision of naturalist human rights emerged, challenging the 
statist regime of human rights.
200
  Constitutional law scholars share the 
universalist position that human rights are natural rights recognized and 
protected by the state, not rights the state has granted to the citizens.
201
  
Social actors also strongly mobilized for a new human rights regime 
consistent with universal standards.
202
 
Importantly, political leadership and constitution-makers also 
adopted a universal outlook on human rights.  A member of the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee told me that the enactment of the 
new Constitution is necessary to reflect the state’s new understanding 
about human rights, which is that human rights are no longer sensitive 
issues and that human rights are different from citizen’s rights.203  
Political leaders and constitution-makers agreed that constitutional rights 
provisions must be revised in concordance with international human 
rights laws.
204
  The group of constitutional drafters responsible for 
                                                             
197
 Christopher E.  Goscha, The Global Origins of Early Vietnamese Republicanism, Part II, 
IMPERIAL & GLOBAL FORUM (Apr. 1, 2014), https://imperialglobalexeter.com/2014/04/01/the-global-
origins-of-early-vietnamese-republicanism-part-ii/ (noting “how the writings of the fathers of modern 
Republicanism, Montesquieu and Rousseau, entered Vietnamese minds.”). 
198
 Bui Ngoc Son, The Global Origins of Vietnam’s Constitutions: Text in Context, 2017 ILL. L.  
REV. 525, 535 (2017).   
199
  Id. at 535–44.  See also SIDEL, supra note 69, at 375.   
200
  Gillespie, supra note 96, at 112; Bui Hai Thiem, Deconstructing the 'Socialist' Rule of Law in 
Vietnam: The Changing Discourse on Human Rights in Vietnam's Constitutional Reform Process, 36 
CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA 77 (2014). 
201
  Phạm Hữu Nghị, Về Định hướng Sửa đổi, Bổ sung các quy định của Hiến pháp năm 1992 về 
Quyền con người, Quyền và Nghĩa vụ Cơ bản của Công dân [On the Orientations to Amend the 1992 
Constitution’s Provisions on Human Rights and Citizen’s Fundamental Rights and Duties] 10 TẠP CHÍ 
NHÀ NƯỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT 12 (2012); Nguyễn Như Phát, Một số Định hướng và Phương pháp ghi 
nhận Quyền Cơ bản của Công dân, Quyền Con người trong Hiến pháp sửa đổi [Some Orientations 
and Methods to Provide for Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and Human Rights in the Revised 
Constitution] 2 TẠP CHÍ NHÀ NƯỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT  3 (2012); Thanh Lưu, Hiến pháp Không phải để 
Ban ơn cho Nhân dân [The Constitution is not Used to Bestow Honor to the People] BÁO PHÁP 
LUẬT TPHCM (Sept. 3, 2012), http://phapluattp.vn/thoi-su/chinh-tri/hien-phap-khong-phai-de-ban-
on-cho-nhan-dan-39991.html. 
202
 Interviews, supra note 16.  See also Bui & Nicholson, supra note 102; Bui Ngoc Son, 
Constitutional Mobilization (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author).   
203
  Interview, supra note 77.       
204
  Interviews, supra note 16.   
506 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.   26 NO.   3 
 
drafting the bill of rights even compared word for word to the 
Vietnamese bill against the various international human rights treaties 
Vietnam has signed to ensure the bill language is consistent with 
international obligations.
205
  When the proposed bill of rights was 
presented to the Constitutional Amendment Committee, it was quickly 
adopted.
206
  On January 1, 2013, during the online dialogue between the 
Government and the people on the revised draft constitution, which was 
released to the public for comments, Vietnamese constitution-makers 
explained the universalist view adopted to write new constitutional rights 
provisions, stating that: “Sixteen provisions on human rights are 
supplemented and applied to everybody residing the territory of Vietnam. 
. . . Previously, to talk about human rights was sensitive.  Now, the state 
considers human rights universal values naturally inherent to human, 
which the Vietnamese people have the right to enjoy.”207   
Consequently, the 2013 Constitution modified the identity of 
human statism.  The Constitution attempts to establish a human rights 
regime in concordance with universal human rights standards.  To 
illustrate, Article 14 attempts to dispel the image of statist rights by 
providing that human rights in Vietnam “are acknowledged, respected, 
and protected in accordance with the Constitution and the law.”208  This 
provision tries to demonstrate a cosmopolitan vision of human rights as 
natural rights respected by the state, not the rights “provided for” by the 
state as in the previous 1992 Constitution.
209
  Moreover, in a number of 
provisions concerning specific individual rights, the subjects of rights are 
referred to as “everyone” rather than “citizens” as in the previous 
constitutions, indicating that rights are valid not because the subject is a 
member of the state but because he or she is a member of the Homo 
sapien community.  The Constitution also includes new rights in 
accordance with international human rights laws, such as the right to life, 
the right to presumption of innocence, and the right to live in a healthy 
environment.
210
 
 The 2013 Constitution also established for the first time the 
principle of balancing, “an inherent part of the near-universal general 
conception of a constitutional right as an important prima facie claim that 
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nonetheless can, in principle, be limited or overridden by non-
constitutional rights claims premised on conflicting public policy 
objectives.”211  Article 14 provides that: “Human rights and citizens’ 
rights shall only be restricted when prescribed by statute in imperative 
circumstances for the reasons of national defence, national security, 
social order and security, social morality and community’s well-
being.”212  The adoption of this near-universal principle of constitutional 
balancing attempts to limit the arbitrary restrictions of human rights by 
administrative authorities, which have been subject to domestic and 
international criticisms, by mandating that only legislative statutes can 
legitimately establish restrictions on human rights for public interests.
213
  
 However, this new view contradicts other provisions that stipulated 
to a more statist vision of human rights.  To illustrate, in contrast to 
Article 14 mentioned above, Article 15 tries to establish a statist human 
rights regime which reflects local values, providing that: “(1) Citizens’ 
rights are inseparable from citizens’ duties; (2) Everyone has the duty to 
respect the rights of others; (3) Citizens are responsible to practice their 
duties to the State and society; (4) The practice of human rights and 
citizens’ rights cannot infringe national interests and legal and legitimate 
rights and interests of others.”214  The Constitution also requires citizens 
to be responsible to the state and prohibits the abuse of rights to infringe 
upon the state’s interests.215  Provisions on specific rights often stipulate 
that rights must be in accordance with the law, indicating that the rights 
are provided and practiced under the state’s regulations.216 
 So, the identity of right statism remains but is modified by the 
incorporation of more universalist outlook on human rights: human rights 
of everyone (not only citizens) are acknowledged (not provided) by the 
state.  This dynamic is animated by the disharmonic human rights regime 
established by the 1992 Constitution.  To begin with, normatively, this 
human rights regime is discordant with international human rights 
standards.  Constitution-makers did realize that this document failed to 
meet international human rights standards.
217
  This gap is because the 
document adopted the statist conception of rights and lacked several 
human rights recognized in international human rights law, such as the 
right to life.  Second, the human rights regime created by the 1992 
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Constitution included internal contradictions and ambiguity.  The 1992 
Constitution introduced the concept of human rights for the first time: “In 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, human rights in all respects, political, 
civic, economic, cultural and social are respected, find their expression in 
the rights of citizens and are regulated by the Constitution and the 
law.”218  The ambiguity is that human rights are equated to citizens’ 
rights regulated by the state.
219
  The phrase “in concordance with the 
law” appeared in most constitutional provisions on citizens’ particular 
rights.  The Constitution also stipulated inseparability of rights from 
duties, and the citizen’s fulfilment of their obligations towards the State 
and society.
220
  So the citizens’ statist rights are discordant with the 
constitutional aspiration of human rights.  Third, the constitutional 
commitment to human rights is discordant with the actual restriction of 
human rights, which has been strongly criticized by domestic activists, 
foreign governments, and international organizations.
221
 
 The gaps between the national human rights regime and 
international standards, the ambiguity and contradiction internal to this 
regime, and the gap between formal human rights commitments and 
actual human rights practices create the condition for different actors to 
seek solutions from global sources.  Consequently, the globalization of 
human rights impacts Vietnamese constitutional identity.  Constitution-
makers and social actors resort to international human rights treaties to 
redefine the meaning of human rights in Vietnam.  However, 
international human rights are situated within the Vietnamese condition 
and local specific human rights vision.  This generates the continuously 
ambiguous human rights regime, which mixes both universal and statist 
human rights commitments.   
 The constitution-making process operates as the mechanism for 
different actors in the polity to engage in a dialogue to redefine the rights 
identity.  In this dialogical forum, the socialist statist principle of rights 
and the universal human rights values are disharmoniously interacting.  
The consequence is the modification of the statist principle of rights.   
Public intellectuals and political leaders expressly state that the new 
Constitution indicates a regime’s new self-understanding and 
commitment about human rights, which is more universalist.
222
  The new 
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Constitution continues to establish a discordant human rights regime, the 
condition for the continuous evolution of the identity of constitutional 
rights in Vietnam.   
5.   Economic Statism and Marketism 
Although the 1992 Constitution abandoned the centrally-planned 
economy, it confirmed the “leading role” of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the economy to ensure its “socialist orientation.”223  This 
provision was subjected to critical debate during the constitution-making 
process.
224
  
To illustrate, in the National Assembly constitutional debate, some 
delegates argued that the confirmation of the leading role of the state 
economic sectors contradicts the provision that every economic sector is 
equal.
225
  While many delegates agreed on the leading role of the SOEs:  
Many opinions held that, during the last years, the state 
economic sectors have received many preferences but have 
operated ineffectively.  Meanwhile, the private and other 
economic sectors are developing robustly, contributing to 
the economy, but have been not properly considered.  
Therefore, the provision that every economic sector is equal 
with the same legal framework will create better 
development to the country, create more wealth, jobs, and 
contribute more to the national budget.
226
   
A delegate argued that the party’s resolution confirms the leading role of 
the SOEs is only valid within five years, while the Constitution has a 
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“higher value.”227  She then concludes: “Whatever we want, the state 
economic sectors cannot play the leading role because this is the rule of 
development and a reality.”228  Another delegate concurs, stating that the 
Constitution has durable effect, and hence should provide for the equality 
of every economic sector.
229
 
 In addition to the SOEs, land ownership is subject to contentious 
debate in the constitution-making process because of its social, 
economic, and political consequences.
230
  The 1992 Constitution 
introduced the principle of “the people’s ownership” of land, which 
actually means the state is the owner of all land.
231
  This principle was 
subject to critical debate.  The most radical proposal—mobilized by 
liberal intellectuals, businessmen, and ordinary people—established a 
multi-form of land ownership, including both state and private 
ownership.  Two other moderate proposals focused on the constraints of 
the state prerogative powers over land without adopting private 
property.
232
  One proposal called for acquisition with compensation 
according to the market price.
233
  The other petitioned for eliminating the 
government’s powers to acquire land for projects of socioeconomic 
developments so as to extinguish the root of corruption in land 
management of provincial authorities.   
The call for privatization of land radically challenges important 
instruments of socialist management in Vietnam.  It is understandable 
that the political leaders have denied the proposal of private property of 
land.   However, the party and state’s commitment to the constraint of the 
state’s authority over land and the enhancement of the quality of the land-
use right presents a more liberal movement unconventional to the Soviet 
thinking.  John Gillespie observes: “The debate so far suggests that party 
thinking about land law has continued its incremental shift from the 
socialist notion of ‘people’s ownership and state management’ to a more 
individualized conception of private proprietary rights.”234 
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The 2013 Constitution continues to confirm “socialist-oriented 
market economy” as a distinctive attribute of socialist Vietnam.235  To 
promote the market economy, the Constitution continues to include the 
commitments to multi-forms of ownership and multi-sectors of economic 
structure; equality, cooperation, and competition among all economic 
sectors; the protection of private property; and global economic 
integration.
236
  The Constitution includes new commitments to the 
encouragement of investment and protection of investors’ capital from 
nationalization.
237
  At the same time, to ensure the “socialist orientation” 
of the economy, the Constitution continues to confirm the “leading role” 
of the state economic sector, the state’s coordination of the economy, the 
state’s ownership of all lands, and the state’s recovery of land used by 
organizations and individuals for developmental projects.
238
  
 The disharmony concerning the 1992 Constitution animates the 
economic dynamics of constitutional identity in Vietnam.  First, the fact 
that the Constitution provided for the dominant role of the state over 
economic resources is discordant with the normative ideals of free market 
and private ownership.  Second, the 1992 Constitution already included 
competing socialist and market commitments: market economy but under 
socialist direction, equal competition but under the leading role of the 
SOEs, private property rights but state ownership of all lands.   
Particularly, the constitutional provision of the “leading role” of the 
state’s economic sector is conceived as contradictory to the constitutional 
commitment of economic equality and fair corporation and competition, 
and this has triggered the call for its elimination.   
Third, there is a significant gap between the constitutional 
economic commitments and practices.  While the Constitution 
established the SOEs as the leading force of the economy, losses and 
corruption at state corporations were significant.
239
  Besides that, the 
contribution of the state economic sector has considerably declined.  To 
illustrate, within ten years (2000–2010), the contribution of the state 
economic sector to the national budget was less than 20%, significantly 
lower than that of the private sectors.  In addition, state enterprises’ 
contribution to GDP declined to 19% in the period 2006–2009, whereas 
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private sectors contributed at double that rate.  Moreover, the rate of 
creating new jobs in state economic sectors decreased to negative 22%, 
which means that state enterprises have cut jobs down rather than created 
new labors.
240
  
 Similarly, while the constitutional aspiration of “people’s 
ownership of lands” is benevolent, to prevent capitalists’ agglomeration 
of lands and to ensure the use of lands for socialist collective goals, the 
reality is different.  Commentators have pointed out that the state, under 
the name of public goals, has expropriated people’s fields to benefit 
individual authorities without offering sufficient compensation.
241
  The 
corruption in land acquisition and land allocation, other types of 
mismanagement of land, and the limits of the courts in dealing with land 
disputes have resulted in mass demonstrations, numerous collective 
petitions, and violent clashes between the farmers and the authorities.
242
  
 The ambiguity and disharmony of the socialist constitutional 
economy, both internally and externally, have created the opportunity for 
solutions through the use of global sources.  A member of the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee and of the group of constitutional 
drafters responsible for drafting the Constitution’s chapter on economic 
and social principles told me that their intention is to create a chapter 
meeting with the (global) “standards of a market economy.”243  The 
global ideas of market economy and private property have been diffused 
in Vietnam and are balanced with the Vietnamese reality and local statist 
economic vision, which results in the mixture of both market and 
socialist elements in the constitutional economy.  Similarly, the party and 
state’s thinking about land ownership also presents a shift to a more 
individualist conception of private proprietary rights but seeks to balance 
it with the conventional collective conception. 
The constitution-making process provides the forum for different 
actors within the Vietnamese polity to rethink and redefine the ideational 
foundation of the constitutional economy.  The socialist economic statism 
is balanced with economic marketism.  Consequently, the state-owned 
economy remains essential to the Vietnamese constitutional polity, but is 
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adapted by adopting new liberal and market ideas.  The socialist identity 
of economic statism is modified by the commitment to “socialist market 
economy” in which the state still controls the economy, but private 
property rights are guaranteed, private enterprises can develop, and some 
limits on the state economic power are possible.  Examples include 
privatization of the state-owned enterprises and the transparent process of 
acquisition and compensation of lands.  Thus, the 2013 Constitution 
establishes a disharmonic constitutional economy, facilitative to the 
continuous evolution of the socialist identity of economic statism.   
6.   Consequence 
 A member of the Constitutional Amendment Committee told me 
that in the new Constitution substantial principles remain but are 
understood with “new ways and new spirit” suitable to the “new 
context.”244  This captures the adaptions to socialist constitutional identity 
in Vietnam.   
 Moreover, the new constitutional commitments have begun to 
inform constitutional practices.  To illustrate, following the commitment 
to constitutional referendum and direct democracy, the National 
Assembly enacted the Law on Referendum November 25, 2015, 
finalizing the restraints on the party-state and amendments to the 
Constitution.
245
  But how this law is implemented remains to be seen.   In 
addition, consistent with the commitment to state constitutionality, 
constitutional oaths have been taken twice in Vietnam since the passage 
of the new Constitution.
246
  Constitutional oaths may raise the political 
leaders’ awareness of the relevance of the constitution to their activities.   
 In addition, new constitutional commitments to distribute and 
control power have been realized to some extent.  The National 
Assembly has revised a number of organic laws to make them consistent 
with the new Constitution, including: Law on Organization of the 
National Assembly (2014); Law on Organization of the Government 
(2015); Law on Organization of the People’s Courts (2014); and Law on 
Organization of the People’s Procucracies (2014).  These laws do not 
merely repeat the constitutional provisions but go on to further clarify the 
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distribution of power.  Moreover, these constitutional laws have had 
some developments with regards to controlling state power, such as 
strengthening the deputies’ right to interpellation of government 
members and the role of the National Assembly’s Legal Committee in 
constitutional supervision.
247
  They have also helped emphasize the 
independence of the government to practice its executive power and 
clarified the personal authority and responsibility of the Prime Minister 
and ministers.
248
  Furthermore, the laws have strengthened judicial 
independence by, for example, extending the judges’ terms to ten years, 
stipulating to adversarial trials, and establishing the role of the Supreme 
Court in developing precedents, which reflects the influence of the 
common law tradition.
249
  Finally, the laws have developed mechanism to 
control state power through stipulating the mutual checks between the 
courts and the procuracies.
250
 
 Similarly, following the new constitutional commitments to human 
rights, a number of legislative acts regarding human rights have been 
revised.  The Minister of Justice states that there are thirty-six legislative 
acts needing revision or replacement in concordance with the new 
Constitution.
251
  The new requirement that human rights can only be 
limited by statutes puts strong pressure on government regulations.
252
  
This means the government cannot issue decrees that limit human rights.  
The Constitution also puts pressure on the National Assembly’s law-
making activities.  National Assembly deputies now have a strong 
concern for how to make sure their legislations are consistent with new 
constitutional rights provisions.
253
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 That has some positive impacts.  For example, the new Civil Code, 
Penal Code, and Criminal Procedure Code have been revised with new 
developments regarding human rights, which helps indicate the 
universalist vision.  To illustrate, the new Civil Code adopted in 2015 
recognizes transgender rights, minimizes the intervention of 
administrative authorities in civil transactions, and forces the courts to 
hear civil complaints even in case of absence of applicable law.
254
  The 
Penal Code excludes the application of death penalty to “under-18 
offenders, pregnant women and women who are nursing children under 
36 months or those who are more than 75 years old when they commit a 
crime or are put into trial.”255  The Code also abolishes the death penalty 
for seven crimes: surrendering to the enemy, opposing order, destruction 
of projects of national security importance, robbery, drug possession, 
drug appropriation, and the production and trade of fake food.
256
  This 
development is consistent with the Constitution’s new recognition of the 
right to life.  The Criminal Procedure Code recognizes the right to 
silence, the detainees’ “right to have legal assistance of lawyers before 
making any statement,” and requires “audio and video recording during 
interrogation” to prevent “torture and other cruel treatments by police 
investigators.”257  
 Yet, the above codes also echo the constitutional disharmony 
regarding human rights.  The Civil Code continues the communitarian-
statist vision of rights, evident by its emphasis on its role in protecting 
not only the interests of the individuals but also the interests of the state 
and the community.  The Penal Code more clearly shows its statist vision 
when it “maintains controversial articles with severe punishments against 
government critics and human rights activists.”258  Dissidents had 
petitioned for removing the offence of “propaganda against the state,” as 
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this violates the constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech.
259
 
This offense continues to be a feature in the new Penal Code. 
Last but not least, new economic constitutional commitments have 
begun to inform the reality.  For example, the Government has 
implemented the policies of equitization or privatization of the state-
owned enterprises.
260
  The new Land Law, effective July 2014, has some 
developments respecting the larger right to use land and a more 
transparent process of acquisition and compensation.
261
 
New constitutional commitments and principles in the 2013 
Constitution shape the scope, potential, and constraints of political, legal, 
and economic reforms in Vietnam.  But, the constraints are not very 
strict, and there is ample space for the continuing dynamics of socialist 
constitutional identity in Vietnam.  First, this is because the 2013 
Constitution is a disharmonic constitution.  Many ideas and principles 
newly introduced in the Constitution are broad and ambiguous, such as 
constituent power by the people, constitutional referendum, controlling 
the state power, and legislative constitutional review, thus opening the 
door for alternative constructions.  Moreover, the disharmonic gap 
between the Constitution and global constitutionalism (for example, party 
leadership vs. free election, unitary vs. separated power, statist vs.  
universal rights, the legislative vs.  judicial constitutional review) creates 
the condition for continuous change in the socialist constitutional 
identity.  In addition, the disharmony between the Constitution and the 
social reality is facilitative of the continuing evolution of the socialist 
constitutional identity.  Most notably, constitutional aspirations to 
“prosperous people” and “that all people enjoy an abundant, free, and 
happy life with conditions for comprehensive development,”262 are 
discordant with the fact that Vietnam is still a middle income country,
263
 
replete with serious social problems, such as a polluted environment, 
social inequality, an underdeveloped education system, terrible 
transportation system, and the like.  The aspiration to the “socialist rule 
of law state” has been discordant with the social reality of corruption, 
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miscarriages of justice, and ineffectiveness of law enforcement.
264
  Also, 
the constitutional commitment to protect universal human rights is 
disharmonic with the functional human rights regime in which rights are 
constricted for statist purposes.  These constitutional disharmonies 
continue to offer space for, and incentives to looking at global sources 
and animate the continuing shifts in constitutional identity in Vietnam.   
In the near future, as judicial review is absent and the constitution-
making process is not available, constitutional dynamics in Vietnam may 
be limited; however, these dynamics may proceed in popular and 
political forums.  In fact, in these popular and legislative platforms, social 
and institutional actors have continued to engage in dialogues on the 
constitutional referendum, the popular checks of the party power, 
mechanisms to control the state powers, the protection of human rights, 
and the constraints of the state power over the economy.
265
  Global 
constitutional ideas still inform this dialogue and are situated with the 
local reality and interact with local ideas.   
 
IV. COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
The experience in four other socialist countries (China, Laos, 
North Korea, and Cuba) also indicates that there are adaptive changes to 
the socialist constitutional identity.  A comprehensive exploration of 
these changes is beyond the scope of this single article.  Instead, I will 
briefly discuss the important trends with a focus on the post-Soviet era.   
A. China   
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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enacted five 
constitutions in 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).   The current 1982 Constitution was 
revised several times in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.
266
  Jianfu Chen 
captures the instrumentalist nature of China’s Constitution in these 
words: “The Constitution in China has been in a constant state of flux, 
reflecting changes in the CPC leadership and in its policies about the kind 
of the future society envisaged.”267  Constitution-making in China is 
under strict party control and significantly lacks public participation.   
According to Jianfu Chen, only in the last constitutional revision (2003–
2004) was the ongoing revision process officially reported, but even 
academic discussions on constitutional revision issues were closed down 
by the Party.
268
  
However, there is initial evidence indicating that this identity has 
been modified by quasi-constitutionalist understanding.   During the post-
Soviet period, like in Vietnam, the idea of constitutionalism together with 
generic elements has played a dominant role in the Chinese constitutional 
intellectual life.
269
  Although the political leaders rejected the global ideas 
of constitutionalism, they adopted a new understanding about the nature 
and role of the constitution, which somewhat reflects the generic 
constitutionalist spirit.  The constitutional amendment in 2009 
incorporated a new principle called “Ruling the Country According to the 
Law,” the Chinese version of socialist rule of law state.270  Following 
this, in the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the Party suggested a discordant 
understanding: “As the Constitution and laws are adopted by the Party 
and the people under its leadership,” “the Party must act within the scope 
prescribed by the Constitution and laws.”271  As Heike Holbig comments, 
“On the one hand, this passage seems to signal the willingness of the 
party to exercise its power only within the confines of the constitutional 
and legal framework, but on the other, the CCP is also clearly asserting 
its claim to be the originator of the constitution, and thus implicitly, the 
authority in control of the constitution.”272  On July 1, 2015, the nation’s 
legislature adopted a bill requiring government officials to pledge 
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allegiance to the nation’s Constitution upon taking office.273  So, China, 
like Vietnam, has begun to establish a culture of constitutional oath, 
although this is not a requirement stipulated to in the constitution as is the 
case in Vietnam.   
Although China’s Constitution retains its instrumentalist nature, it 
also operates as the framework for constitutionalism debate and even for 
Chinese citizens to struggle for realization of their constitutional rights.
274
  
Thus, constitutional instrumentalism remains the dominant feature of the 
Chinese constitutional order, but is adjusted with new constitutionalist 
consciousness and practice, indicative of inchoate constitutionalism.   
In addition to instrumentalism, party vanguardism is a core of the 
Chinese constitutional polity, but it is also adaptively changed.   The 
current 1982 Constitution of China refers to the leadership of the CPC in 
its preamble rather than expressly mandating this in a constitutional 
provision, as did the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions.
275
   Although this 
change does not alter the nature of the party leadership, it moderates this 
nature and leaves space for multiparty system.   In fact, party 
vanguardism is adapted in the Chinese context by the local specific 
system called “multi-party cooperation and political consultation 
system.”276  In China, there are eight democratic parties operating under 
the control of the CPC.   They do not oppose the CPC and the regime.   
The basic principle is that “The CPC is the only party in power in the 
People’s Republic of China while under the precondition of accepting the 
leadership of the CPC, the eight other political parties participate in the 
discussion and management of state affairs, in cooperation with the 
CPC.”277  The Constitution’s preamble confirms the commitment that: 
“The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by 
the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China for a long 
time to come.”278  This commitment is embodied in practice by the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences through which the 
CPC consults other parties on national affairs.
279
  Another practical 
embodiment is the appointment of members of democratic parties to 
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government posts.
280
  Thus, the essence of the vanguard role of the CPC 
remains but is adapted by the aspirational principle of multi-party 
cooperation and political consultation.   
Another adaption to the Chinese constitutional vanguardism is 
related to Jiang Zemin’s “three represents” doctrine.   One of the three 
elements is that the Party represents “the development trends of advanced 
productive forces.”281  The implication is that capitalists are not enemies 
of Chinese socialism.  The practical embodiment of this “new thinking” 
is the invitation of “capitalists” to join the CPC.282  So, the party 
vanguardism remains the dominant feature but is adjusted by “new 
thinking” that allows the pragmatic incorporation of alternative social 
forces into the communist party.  The constitutional commitment to a 
multiparty system, but under the exclusive leadership of one communist 
Party, creates the disharmonic condition for the continuing dynamics of 
constitutional vanguardism in China.   
On constitutional structure, an Article of China’s 1982 
Constitution confirms that: “The State organs of the People’s Republic of 
China apply the principle of democratic centralism.”283  Democratic 
centralism is connected with the proletarian dictatorship.  The supremacy 
of the National People’s Congress is a political form of “the people’s 
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants.”284  The separation of power, judicial 
review, and judicial independence are rejected in this centralized and 
dictatorial constitutional arrangement.   
But, within the community of Chinese constitutional intellectuals, 
separatism is the prevailing model of constitutional thought.   For 
example, like the 2013 constitutional debate in Vietnam, the essential 
spirit of pro-constitutionalist arguments in China’s 2013 
constitutionalism debate is defined by fundamental aspirations of generic 
constitutionalism, including the aspiration of a separationist 
government.
285
  The party-state, however, rejects the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.  Democratic centralism remains the core value of 
the Chinese constitutional polity, but is adjusted to the new context.  The 
party-state in China as well as in Vietnam does not reject an 
understanding of distribution of the public power.  But different from 
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Vietnam, the idea of distribution of power in China is substantively 
articulated, not through formal constitution-making, but legislation.
286
 
More prominent adaption to the socialist principle of democratic 
centralism concerns vertical governmental relations, evidenced by the 
concepts of regional autonomy, “Special Economic Zones”, and Special 
“Administrative Region,” or “one country, two systems” (OCTS).287  
Such pragmatic adjustment creates discordant concepts and principles.  
For example, Albert Chen argues that: “The story of the debate on and 
struggle for universal suffrage in Hong Kong thus reveals such 
underlying tensions behind, and the contradictions inherent in, the very 
concept and practice of ‘OCTS.’”288  In other words, constitutional 
dynamics in Hong Kong are engendered by the disharmony internal to 
the aspiration of OCTS. 
China’s 1982 Constitution also includes rights provisions in the 
spirit of socialist statism.  The Constitution establishes the principle of 
unity of rights and duties.
289
  The practice of rights is limited by the state 
and collective interests.
290
  Yet, China has adapted its understanding of 
rights, evident by the incorporation of the idea of “human rights” in the 
Constitution through the 2004 constitutional amendment. Chen 
comments: “China has now finally come to accept universal, rather than 
insisting on an ‘Asian’ or ‘Chinese’ conception of human rights.”291  This 
reconceptualization of human rights has practical implications: “The 
scope of human rights could be interpreted to include not only the 
fundamental rights as codified in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, but also 
those contained in at least the two International Covenants  and other 
international human rights treaties that China has agreed to abide by.”292  
Thus, rights statism remains the dominant feature of the Chinese 
constitutional polity, but is adapted by more universalist understanding.   
Finally, economic statism remains at the core of the Chinese 
constitutional economy, but is also adjusted with new understanding.   
The ideas of “socialist public ownership of the means of production”, 
“State-owned economy” as “the leading force in the national economy”, 
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and state and collective ownership of land are all constitutionally 
confirmed.
293
   But Dengism has adopted a pragmatic approach to the 
socialist economy, leading to the practice of the opening and reforming 
of policy.  The fundamental aspiration of the Chinese party-state is to 
build “socialism with Chinese characteristics” or “Chinese style of 
socialism.”294  This has resulted in the adjustment to the identity of 
economic statism by adapting liberal economic principles.   
Consequently, the Constitution is committed to a “socialist market 
economy,” “diverse sectors of the economy developing side by side,” the 
land use right, and inviolable lawful private property.
295
  These 
fundamental commitments have actually informed the Chinese 
constitutional economy, as economic dynamics in the country in the last 
three decades indicate.
296
  Thus, the Constitution confirms the socialist 
economy but at the same time adopts capitalist economic elements, 
creating the disharmonic condition for the continuing development of the 
identity of a Chinese constitutional economy.   
China’s 1982 Constitution together with its amendments is a 
disharmonic constitution.  It includes internal discordant provisions 
regarding the party leadership, constitutional supremacy, constitutional 
structure, rights, and economy.  This internal disharmony, together with 
the gap between the socialist constitutional ideals, the Chinese society 
and general constitutional ideas, constitutes the condition for the 
continuing dynamics of socialist constitutional identity.   This condition 
is caused by China’s speed of economic development, the emergence of 
new social groups and their mobilization, and the impact of 
globalization.
297
 Constitutional identity has changed through formal 
constitution-making and amendment.  Chinese constitutional 
exceptionalism (political elite’s distinctive doctrines) defines the extent 
to which socialist constitutional identity is modified in China.   
B. Laos 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) is another socialist 
country in the contemporary world.   Laos goes even farther than China 
to amend the core of socialist constitutional identity.  The communist Lao 
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People’s Revolutionary Party seized power in 1975, abolishing the royal 
government’s 1947 Constitution, which in turn succeeded the first 1945 
Constitution of the Lao Issara (Free Lao) Government.
298
  The Party 
Secretary General Kaysone stated that the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic should “urgently undertake the major task . . . of preparing a 
socialist constitution at an early date.”299  But it was not until 1991 that 
the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s legislative body, enacted 
the socialist constitution.
300
  This charter “was strongly influenced by the 
socialist Constitutions of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchia.”301  The constitution-making process was under 
the Party’s control.302  The 1991 Constitution was amended in 2013, 
effectively leading to its replacement by the 2013 Constitution.  The 
Constitution was recently amended in 2015 to “respond to the Party’s 
renovation policies and the country’s development vision until 2030.”303  
While the instrumentalist nature of Laos’ Constitution remains, it 
is modified by the involvement of the public in the constitution-making 
process.  In this regard, Laos is distant from China and closer to Vietnam.  
The draft constitution was published in 1990 in a Party journal for public 
discussion and mobilization, albeit under party control.
304
  Public 
participation in the 2015 constitutional amendment process is also 
striking.  “Leaders, senior revolutionary combatants, retired officials, 
civil servants, technical officials, soldiers, police officers, intellectuals, 
and ordinary people of all classes” had been encouraged to submit 
proposals for the constitutional amendment.
305
  A series of seminars were 
held in regions across the country where policymakers shared their views 
“in order to draw up the draft.”306  Public participation is the base for the 
claim in the preamble that: “This Constitution is the fruit of the process 
of the people's discussions throughout the country.”307  Thus, the 
instrumentalist aspiration is moderated by the public participation in 
constitution-making. 
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Laos’ Constitution also mandates the Lao People’s Revolutionary 
Party (LPRP) as the “leading nucleus” of political system.308  But, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist ideology of LPRP has 
been considerably eroded, except the principle of the party’s monopoly 
of political power.
309
  The erosion of communist ideology has resulted in 
other constitutional variations in Laos.  In regards to structure, the 
Constitution establishes that: “The National Assembly and other state 
organizations are established and function in accordance with the 
principle of democratic centralism.”310  But the delineation of the three 
state branches “do not imitate any particular model (neither Vietnamese, 
nor Russian, nor French), but it pays respect to the idea of a basic 
blueprint of responsibilities lodged in designed institutions.”311  Perhaps, 
the most notable adaption to “democratic centralism” is the pragmatic 
practice of political decentralization which allows local governments to 
enjoy great autonomy.  This is due in part to “the limited resources and 
poor communication” with the central government and in part to the 
central government’s incentive to “encourage local government to 
establish direct contacts with the boarders with China, Thailand, and 
Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring jurisdictions.”312 
The Constitution also includes a list of fundamental rights whose 
practice is “provided by the laws” or “not contrary to the laws.”313  
Laotian citizens are constitutionally required “to respect the Constitution 
and the laws, to observe labor discipline, [and to comply with] the 
regulations relating to social life and public order.”314  The practice of 
rights depends on the state’s regulatory laws, but there is no institutional 
mechanism for the citizens to question the constitutionality of the laws 
regulating their rights.   This reserves the core of statist rights.  But 
fundamental rights established in Laos’ Constitution are adaptive to the 
local context and seem more liberal and less statist than those in China 
and Vietnam.  The restriction of rights in the name of state interests is not 
explicitly established in the Constitution.  Moreover, recent constitutional 
amendments prohibit “all forms of bureaucratic threats and actions that 
undermine the physical and mental wellbeing or the dignity of the 
people,” and “actions that cause damage to their rightful assets,” ensure 
“solidarity and equal rights among the multiethnic people,” protect 
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intellectual property rights and the rights of foreign nationals in Laos and 
of those who have no nationality.
315
 
On the economy, the Constitution also provides for the state’s 
centralized management of the economy and land as “a national 
heritage,” which citizens are granted to use by the state.316  But, the 
Constitution is committed to a “market economy,” albeit “regulated by 
the state in the direction of socialism.”317  Commentators indicate that 
“the chapter on the socioeconomic system does not mention the 
establishment of socialism, a principal goal of earlier dogma.”318  Instead, 
the main goal of the national economy is to “transform the natural 
economy into a trading and manufacturing economy.”319  On this base, 
the Constitution underlines the commitments to the promotion of 
domestic and foreign investment, protection of “lawful assets and capital 
of investors” from state confiscation, seizure, or nationalization, and 
protection and promotion of “all forms of property rights.”320 
Socialist constitutional identity in Laos is unique.  It is determined 
by the complex history of communism in the country, domestic ethnic 
diversity, the undeveloped economy, and the country’s international 
relationship with its neighbors—China, Vietnam, and Thailand—and the 
western world.
321
  The current trend seems to indicate that Laos does not 
strictly adhere to the socialist constitutional ideology, except the idea of 
party leadership.  Ideological relaxation allows Laos to freely amend the 
socialist constitutional identity without abandoning its core.  The fall of 
the Soviet Union was an important external factor that created the erosion 
of communist ideology in Laos.  But, the erosion is, perhaps principally, 
determined by the local condition.  Specifically, poverty and economic 
difficulty make socioeconomic transformation, rather than ideological 
commitments, the political elites’ preoccupation.  Consequently, there is 
a significant disharmony between the adherence to socialist ideals and the 
real imperative of socioeconomic development, and the Laos 
constitutional polity tends to favor reality over ideals.   
The national goal established in the constitutional preamble is 
generic rather than specifically socialist, namely “the objective of 
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building Laos into a country of peace, independence, democracy, unity 
and prosperity.”322  This objective is considered “the long-standing 
aspirations and strong determination of the national community.”323  The 
commitment to a community’s self-determination allows the people to 
participate in the constitution-making process as moderators of socialist 
constitutional instrumentalism.  The justification of party vanguardism in 
Laos is “to defend the national interest or fight for the interests and 
aspiration of the people,”324 which is more nationalist and populist and 
less relevant to the socialist objectives.  But, most importantly, the 
paramount concern of the Constitution is economic development, which 
is less meant to idealistically transform into socialism than to realistically 
“improve the material and spiritual living conditions of the multi-ethnic 
people.”325  The Constitution attempts to realize this through a strong 
commitment to the promotion of investment and protection of investors’ 
property and rights.  Laos offers an example of how national 
constitutions are used to attract foreign investments in the globalizing 
era.
326
  But, social and economic improvement and the aspiration to 
attract foreign investment seem to be the dominant sprit of the whole 
Constitution of Laos, not merely the chapter on socioeconomic system.  
The Constitution seemingly tries to distance itself from specific socialist 
language and adopts more generic constitutional norms, especially 
fundamental rights, to communicate with the rest of the world where 
socialist polity is a minority.   
Consequently, Laos’ Constitution is a disharmonic constitution.  
The internal disharmony concerns: the generic aspiration and the 
principle of the communist party as the core of the polity; “democratic 
centralism” and political decentralization; the market economy and the 
state’s direction to socialism; and rights granted and controlled by the 
state but also limiting authority’s arbitrariness.   Externally, there is a 
considerable gap between the constitutional commitment to 
socioeconomic improvement, and even prosperity, and the real poverty 
and economic difficulty.   Moreover, the Constitution is also discordant 
with many generic constitutional aspirations like free elections, universal 
rights, and constitutional review.   These constitutional disharmonies are 
created by several factors, including: the post-Soviet experience and the 
continuing aspirations of socioeconomic transition; and the incentive to 
engage in the global market.  These constitutional disharmonies are the 
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conditions for the continuing transition of the constitutional identity in 
Laos.   
C. North Korea   
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, 
is a socialist country, but an aberrant case.   Under the rule of the 
communist Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), North Korea has six 
constitutions enacted in 1948, 1972, 1992, 1998, 2009, and 2012.
327
  The 
instrumentalist nature of the constitution is embodied strongly in North 
Korea.  Darren C. Zook remarks: “Each of the Constitutions of North 
Korea has emerged out of transformative moments when cumulative 
political change necessitated a corresponding legal expression to 
legitimate and articulate the new orientation and outlook of the state.”328  
But the unique manifestation of socialist constitutional instrumentalism 
in North Korea is the fact that the Constitution is instrumental to personal 
communist rule.  Successive constitutions were adopted to legitimize the 
authority of successive leaders: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong 
Un.  The recent constitutional amendment in 2016 enabled Kim Jong Un 
to become an absolutist national leader.  According to Rodong Sinmun, a 
North Korean newspaper, “[In] order to arrange the strong legal 
groundwork for the path towards the socialist powerhouse, to be lead 
[sic] by Kim Jong Un’s monolithic leadership, we are to review and 
adopt the amendment of DPRK’s socialist constitution.”329 
North Korea’s Constitution confirms the core of the socialist 
constitutional identity, namely the leadership of the communist party, 
centralized power, statist rights, and statist economy.
330
  These 
constitutional principles do inform constitutional politics in North 
Korea.
331
  But the fall of communism in the post-Soviet era led North 
Korea to abandon any reference to the Soviet constitutional values and 
Marxism-Leninism, and to develop its own modus operandi of socialism.  
The ideological principle called juche (self-reliance) was constitutionally 
confirmed as the guiding principle of the regime.
332
  This principle, 
which stresses economic, political, and military independence and self-
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reliance, has resulted in North Korea’s constitutional isolationism.  A 
related ideological principle is seongun sasang (military first ideology), 
which aspires to create  combination of political and military rule.
333
  The 
2016 constitutional amendment, which creates a new body called 
Commission on State Affairs headed by Kim Jong Un and enables him to 
enjoy leadership roles in the military, party, and government, is the 
embodiment of the constitutional seongun principle.
334
   
North Korea is a negative example of the dynamics of socialist 
constitutional identity.  The fundamental aspiration underpinning 
constitutional isolationism and domestic military ideology—the purity of 
socialism—inhibits the emergence of competing constitutional 
understandings.  Therefore, the condition for the development of socialist 
constitutional identity in North Korea is limited.  This limitation of the 
disharmonic condition is due to economic difficulty, which inhibits the 
emergence of a pluralist society, and the isolationism, which limits the 
diffusion of global constitutional ideas in North Korea.   
However, North Korea has been confronted with economic 
difficulty, which necessarily prompts constitutional change.  The 
disharmony between the constitutional isolationist aspiration and the 
aspiration of economic development and foreign investment has created 
the opportunity for growth of North Korea’s constitutional economy.  To 
be sure, North Korea does not have a systematic vision of market reforms 
like those of China and Vietnam.  But, a moderate modification of the 
state-owned economy was undertaken through the Joint Venture Act of 
1984, effectively a constitutional law that allowed economic cooperation 
between North Korean industry and foreign enterprises.  The 1992 
Constitution then legitimized foreign trade and foreign investment and 
joint venture enterprises.
335
  
The current Constitution continues the commitment that: “The 
State shall encourage institutions, enterprises and organizations in our 
country to joint ventures and cooperation of enterprise with foreign 
corporations and individuals as well as the establishment and operation of 
a variety of enterprise in special economic zones.”336  The Constitution is 
also committed to “guarantee the legal rights and interests of foreigners 
in its region.”337  In addition, there are also constitutional commitments to 
the protection of private property, and even copyrights, inventions, and 
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patents.
338
  North Korean citizens “could now earn money from private 
economic activities, and the fruits of their economic activities.”339  The 
economic constitutional commitments have been initially 
implemented.
340
  Particularly, “under Kim Jong Un, Chinese-style private 
farming has been encouraged and large numbers of North Koreans have 
been sent to China to study its reform experience.”341  This adoption of 
new constitutional economic commitments enables the identity of 
constitutional economy in North Korea to evolve albeit under the tight 
control of the state.   
The constitutional disharmony between the constitutional principal 
of juche (self-reliance) and commitment to foreign investment, as well as 
economic development, present an opportunity for the evolution of 
constitutional identity in North Korea.   Dae-kyu Yoon comments: “If an 
open-door policy is the inevitable option to overcome the country’s 
current economic difficulty, the rule of law will be one of the most 
important vehicles to persuade foreigners to trust the system and 
economic co-operation.”342  Moreover, the imperative of economic 
development and foreign investment necessarily leads to the impact of 
globalization on the constitutional identity in North Korea, which is 
discordant with the aspiration to constitutional isolationism.
343
  This may 
create the potential condition for North Korea’s transnational 
constitutional engagement, which would engender the continuing 
dynamics of constitutional identity.   
D.   Cuba 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Cuba has 
continued the communist regime but has also needed to acclimate itself 
to a new context.   The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Communista 
de Cuba, PCC) met in October 1991 to consider the consequence of the 
collapse of the communist world to Cuba.
344
  In the meeting, the Party 
decided to revise the nation’s 1976 Constitution to adapt.  “The 
leadership closely controlled the process of constitutional revision, and 
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the PCC and the National Assembly committees carried out the task.”345  
The constitutional amendments were approved in July 1992 by the Party 
and the National Assembly.
346
  The Constitution was amended again in 
2002 to confirm that socialism is irrevocable.
347
  Thus, instrumentalism 
remains the core feature in Cuban constitutional polity.   
The Constitution also confirms the common core of the socialist 
constitutional identity.  Article 5 mandates: “The Communist Party of 
Cuba, Martian and of Marxist-Leninist, the organized vanguard of the 
Cuban nation, is the superior leading force of the society and the 
State.”348 The principle of “democratic centralism” is modified as 
“socialist democracy,” but the substantial meaning remains the same.  
The constitutional structure includes the National Assembly as “the 
supreme organ of State power”349 and other institutions (the Council of 
State, the Council of Ministers, and courts) subordinate to the former.
350
 
Constitutional rights are provided,
351
 but its practice must conform to 
“the goals of a socialist society.”352  The centrally planned economy and 
state’s ownership of land are constitutionally confirmed.353  
However, the Constitution adopts some adaptive changes as a 
response to the fall of the communist bloc.  Fundamental national goals 
are redefined to be more inclusive rather than exclusively socialist.  The 
constitutional preamble established “sociopolitical ideas of Marx, Engels, 
and Lenin” as the guiding principles, but now also follows “ideology of 
José Martí.”354  Consequently, the Constitution established a commitment 
to achieve José Martí’s strong desire: “I want the fundamental law of our 
republic to be the tribute of Cubans to the full dignity of man.”355  Article 
1 then establishes the regime’s constitutional commitment to serving “the 
good of all.”356  Moreover, the new Article 55 eliminated the Marxist idea 
of “scientific materialism” and incorporates a new commitment to 
respecting and guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion.
357
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But, like North Korea, Cuba is a negative example of socialist 
constitutional identity change.  Larry Catá Backer argues that the PCC is 
the center of political and economic reform in Cuba.
358
  While the 
communist parties in China, Vietnam, and Laos have tried to become the 
ruling party looking forward to attain developmental goals, the 
communist party in Cuba has remained a revolutionary party looking 
retrospectively “to reserve the communist society achieved at the 
moment of revolutionary triumph.”359  Reservationism and “ossification 
of Cuban Marxism-Castroism” inhibit the emergence of discordant 
constitutional visions, which in turn limits the dynamics of constitutional 
identity.
360
  The ossified ideological foundation makes the constitutional 
polity in Cuba remain deeply Leninist.   
However, like North Korea, Cuba has to deal with economic 
difficulties and hence the constitutional economy has been adapted for 
this purpose.  Unlike China, Vietnam, and Laos, Cuba has rejected the 
marketization of the economy and has maintained the centrally planned 
economy dominated by state-owned enterprises.
361
  While private 
enterprises are not allowed, the Constitution allows the establishment of 
“mixed enterprises, and by economic partnerships and associations” and 
is committed to protect their property,
362
 which, like North Korea, is 
meant to attract foreign investments.
363
  Following the constitutional 
aspiration of foreign investment, a new law on foreign investment was 
adopted in 2014, but its implementation regulations depended on the state 
actors’ multi-level review and approval due to the ideological constraints 
of economic statism.
364
  Thus, revolutionary reservationism is discordant 
with the constitutional aspiration to foreign investment and the actual 
need of socioeconomic transition.  This moderate disharmonic 
constitutional condition, the imperative of social and economic 
transition,
365
 and the possible global engagement
366
 (particularly 
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transnational dialogue with China),
367
 constitute potential elements of the 
dynamics of socialist constitutional identity in Cuba.   
B. Comparative Reflections  
The general trend shared among the five socialist countries is that 
core elements of socialist constitutional identity have remained, but 
adapted to acclimate to the globalizing world.  After the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc, all five countries had to address economic and institutional 
reform.  This necessarily required adjustment to constitutional ideas and 
principles foundational to the polity.  Constitution-making is the main 
mechanism through which socialist constitutional identity change takes 
place.  The change involves the dialogical interaction between socialist 
constitutional identity and global constitutional identity.  All five 
countries have pragmatically referenced, incorporated, and redefined 
some ideas and principles of generic constitutionalism, albeit with 
different levels.  Consequently, all five operating socialist constitutions 
are disharmonic to varying degrees allowing for the continuous 
development of socialist constitutionalist identity.   
There are at least two factors explaining that convergence.  First, 
globalization compels socialist countries to adapt their constitutional 
identity.  Constitutional globalization is inevitable, and the Vietnamese 
story has indicated how this affects the dynamics of socialist 
constitutional identity.
368
  Laos is more willing to engage in global 
constitutional dialogue, mainly due to the national economy’s heavy 
reliance on foreign investment.  Despite constitutional exceptionalism 
which contributes to China’s resistance to global constitutionalism, China 
has also signed major international human rights treaties and 
incorporated the ideas of human rights and property rights into the 
nation’s constitution.  Despite North Korea’s isolationism and Cuba’s 
reservationism, the imperative of economic development and foreign 
investment are the driving forces of at least modest global constitutional 
engagement.   
The second factor concerns transnational engagement within the 
five socialist countries.  There are actual signs that they have engaged in 
dialogue to share their experiences and visions of change.  To illustrate, 
Dwight H. Perkins indicates that: “The leaders of Vietnam certainly 
knew about and learned from the reform experiences of China that 
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preceded their reform effort.”369  Laos’s dialogical engagement with 
Vietnam is also one of the reasons for its adoption of the idea of socialist 
market economy.
370
  As mentioned above, North Korea and Cuba have 
also engaged in dialogue with China on reforming issues.   
Yet, there is divergence in socialist constitutional identity adaption 
among the five countries.  The constitutional identity adaption in 
Vietnam is perhaps the most far-reaching among the five countries, 
evident by the bold constitutional commitments to popular constituent 
power, constitutional referendum, the party under the Constitution, 
distributed and controlled power, and universal human rights.  Vietnam, 
China, and Laos have adapted to all five elements of socialist 
constitutional identity, while North Korea and Cuba only have moderate 
adaption to the constitutional economy.  Consequently, the socialist 
countries have different models in their reactions to global impact on 
their constitutional identity, which can be characterized as constitutional 
globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism (China); 
constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional 
reservationism (Cuba).  These variations are defined by the history of 
communism, intellectual environment, the economic condition, the social 
structure, the size and population of the respective countries, and the role 
of the respective countries in the global economic and political order. 
CONCLUSION 
This study focuses on the impact of globalization to local 
constitutional identity.  As the Vietnamese case indicates, socialist 
constitutional identity is retained through modification and extension due 
to the impact of globalization.  I conclude with some general reflections.   
The studies on constitutional globalization should go beyond the 
consideration of the convergence of rules, institutions, or constitutional 
jurisprudence.  More fundamental is the globalization of constitutional 
ideas and principles.  The studies of the causal effects require the balance 
between quantitative and qualitative research.   
Moreover, this study suggests implications for further studies of 
constitutional identity.  To begin with, the inquiry into constitutional 
identity cannot be limited to constitutionalist polities.  If “the concept of 
constitutional identity should be at the center of constitutional theory,”371 
and the inquiry into constitutional identity is just limited to 
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constitutionalist systems, it follows that constitutional theory will be 
centralized around a limited set of American, European, and a few other 
institutional settings that have met basic requirements of 
constitutionalism.  If this is the case, constitutional theory will ignore a 
number of non-constitutionalist constitutional experiences in different 
corners of the globe.  A polity needs not be constitutionalist to acquire 
constitutional identity.  Every constitutional system has ideas and 
principles fundamental to its existence, which are not simply ignored by 
autocrats at will.  Moreover, if the condition of constitutional disharmony 
is universal, the potential of constitutional identity change is internal to 
every constitutional order.  In addition, formal amendments to 
constitutional identity should be taken into account.  In polities where 
judicial review is absent or weak, the evolution of constitutional identity 
may be taking place through formal mechanisms like formal 
constitutional amendments.  Last but not least, global spread of 
constitutionalism is an important factor that animates the dynamics of 
constitutional identity in non-constitutionalist countries.  Therefore, it is 
important to study the connection between constitutional globalization 
and domestic constitutional identity dynamics.   
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